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Users demand high-bandwidth, ubiquitous and low-cost network services. This demand has
pushed ISPs and application providers to offer more bandwidth, allow users to access the
Internet almost everywhere, and provide cheap or free network services using peer-to-peer
networks. These three trends underlie the growing success of today’s Internet. However,
(1) high-bandwidth can empower more effective denial-of-service attacks; (2) Internet access
is widespread, but still not ubiquitous; and (3) peer-to-peer network services need to solve
the service discovery problem. This thesis addresses these three challenges.
First, we tackle denial-of-service attacks. The high bandwidth available in many parts
of the Internet allows denial-of-service attacks to be effective, and the large scale of the
Internet makes detecting and preventing these attacks difficult. Anonymity and openness
of the Internet worsens this problem because anyone can send anything to anybody. To
prevent these denial-of-service attacks, we propose Permission-Based-Sending (PBS), a sig-
naling architecture for network traffic authorization. PBS uses the explicit permission to
give legitimate users the authority to send packets. Signaling is used to configure this per-
mission in the data path. This signaling approach enables easy installation for granting
authorization to flows, and allows PBS to be deployed in existing networks. In addition, a
monitoring mechanism provides a second line of defense against attacks.
Next, we strive to make Internet access more ubiquitous. When public transportation
stations have access points to provide Internet access to passengers, public transportation
becomes a more attractive travel and commute option. However, the Internet connectivity
is intermittent because passengers can access the Internet only when a bus or train is within
the networking coverage of an AP at a stop. To efficiently handle this intermittent network
for the public transit system, we develop Internet Cache on Wheels (ICOW), a system that
provides a low-cost way for bus and train operators to offer access to Internet content.
Each bus and train car is equipped with a smart cache that serves popular content to
passengers. The cache updates its content based on passenger requests when it is within
range of Internet access points placed at bus stops, train stations or depots. This aggregated
Internet access is significantly more efficient than having passengers contact Internet access
points individually and ensures continuous availability of content throughout the journey.
Finally, we consider peer-to-peer services. Typical service discovery mechanisms in peer-
to-peer networks cause significant overhead, consuming energy and bandwidth: (1) in highly
mobile networks, service discovery consumes the energy of mobile devices to discover services
that newly joined members provide; and (2) peer-to-peer network systems consumes band-
width during service discovery. To resolve and analyze these service discovery problems,
(1) we design an efficient service discovery mechanism that reduces energy consumption of
mobile devices; and (2) we evaluate the bandwidth consumption caused by service discovery
in real-world peer-to-peer networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Users demand high bandwidth, ubiquitous and low-cost network services. This demand has
pushed ISPs and application providers to offer more bandwidth, allow users to access the
Internet almost everywhere, and provide cheap or free network services using peer-to-peer
networks. High bandwidth enables multimedia network services such as IPTV or Voice-
over-IP (VoIP) communications that are changing the way we live. End users’ desire to
use network services anytime and anywhere has encouraged ISPs to provide more access
points and base stations. Internet access from mobile devices has become commonplace.
Decentralized architectures such as peer-to-peer networks brought a new breed of networking
applications that offer cheap or free services. File sharing and VoIP applications based on
peer-to-peer networks have become a popular class of Internet applications.
However, despite their success, network services are faced with new challenges. First,
high bandwidth networks attract malicious traffic that disrupts network systems. Servers
on the Internet today are frequently subject to denial-of-service attacks. Second, Internet
connectivity is more widespread than ever, but our growing dependence on the Internet
demands ubiquitous connectivity, which we have not yet achieved. Hence, mobile device
users experience intermittent network services. Lastly, peer-to-peer applications require
service discovery, but typical discovery mechanisms have significant overhead, consuming
energy and network bandwidth.
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1.1 Challenges
This Section addresses three challenges of the current network infrastructure in more detail:
(1) Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks; (2) Internet access in intermittently connected networks
for ubiquitous access; and (3) inefficiency of service discovery mechanisms in distributed
network systems. The overview of solutions for these problems are discussed in the following
Section (Section 1.2).
Routers and end users are vulnerable to high bandwidth attack flows in the
current network infrastructure. Indeed, the high bandwidth of the Internet allows DoS
attacks to be effective, and the large scale of the Internet makes detecting and preventing
DoS attacks difficult. According to reports by Arbor Networks [1] and Symantec [2], the
bandwidth of attack flows and the number of active compromised computers have increased
over the past decades even though solutions against DoS attacks [3][4][5][6][7] have been
proposed. In addition, the anonymity and openness of the Internet worsens this problem
because anyone can send anything to anybody. These characteristics of the current network
infrastructure raise the issue of authentication and authorization of network traffic in order
to prevent DoS attacks. Therefore, to ensure robust and secure networks, we design a
practical and deployable signaling system to authorize network traffic.
The second challenge is web service disruption caused by intermittent network
connection. The interesting scenario of this intermittent network connectivity can be found
in the Internet access in public transit systems. When stations have access points (APs),
passengers can access the Internet. Because of the limited networking coverage of an AP,
however, passengers would experience interrupted network connection. Even though 3G/4G
network services cover a larger area than WLAN, users may still want to use WLAN service
in certain situations, such as when (1) not everybody can afford or wants to subscribe to a
3G/4G data plan, (2) international travelers would have to pay exorbitant roaming rates to
use 3G/4G network services, and (3) the link throughput of WLAN networks is higher than
3G/4G networks. It is also unlikely that WLAN networks will be prevalent throughout
cities in near future. Even though some cities provide city-wide WLAN services, such as
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Oulu, Finland [8], most cities do not provide city-wide WLAN services 1. Hence, we design
a system that efficiently provides Internet content to passengers by using a cache-based
mechanism in this intermittently connected network.
The final challenge comes along with service discovery, the core component in peer-to-
peer networks. There are two aspects to this challenge. First, peer-to-peer architecture
consumes energy during service discovery, especially in distributed ad-hoc net-
works. In highly mobile environments, to discover and use services that other mobile
devices provide, each device has to announce and browse frequently. This frequent message
transmissions cause energy consumption of mobile devices. Thus, we design a cross-layer
system which allows mobile devices to detect network membership changes, so that mobile
devices can efficiently discover new services that new members provide. Second, peer-to-
peer architecture consumes bandwidth during service discovery. There are two
types of peer-to-peer systems, namely unstructured and structured systems. In unstruc-
tured peer-to-peer systems, peers are not connected by pre-defined rules. iTunes music
sharing are popular sharing applications using unstructured peer-to-peer architecture. For
lookup services of iTunes application, nodes multicast queries to all multicast group mem-
bers. Structured peer-to-peer systems need to maintain their structures. One of the pop-
ular structured systems is distributed hash table (DHT)-based system. It provides overlay
routing methods between peers for a distributed lookup service. Both structured and un-
structured systems consume bandwidth: unstructured systems increase message overhead
to announce and browse services through networks, and structured systems have control
message overhead to maintain the structure. Therefore, we measure and analyze multicast
service discovery traffic and the control message overhead caused by a DHT-based peer-to-
peer lookup protocol.
1Even though many cafes, restaurants, and book stores offer free WLAN services, these services do
not cover the whole city, and many free WLAN services have disappeared. Community-based free WLAN
services, such as FON (http://corp.fon.com/en), exist, but they are not very popular.
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1.2 Overview and Contributions
This thesis defines problems mentioned above and provides system-level solutions to design
robust, ubiquitous, and distributed network infrastructures in three parts. Part I (Chap-
ter 2) presents a system-level solution to prevent DoS attacks by authorizing network traffic.
Part II (Chapter 3) presents a system design for Internet access in intermittently connected
networks allowing ubiquitous access to content. Part III (Chapter 4-6) presents an efficient
service discovery mechanism to reduce energy consumption of mobile devices, and focuses
on analyzing the service discovery and control message overhead in real-world peer-to-peer
networks.
Chapter 2 presents Permission-Based Sending (PBS) [9][10], a robust and secure sys-
tem architecture and protocol that authorizes network traffic. This system takes a hybrid
approach: a proactive approach of explicit permissions and a reactive approach of moni-
toring and countering attacks. The explicit permission can differentiate legitimate traffic
from malicious traffic, and the monitoring mechanism can provide a second line of defense
against malicious attacks. This system is based on on-path signaling that requests, grants,
and installs authorization information (permission state) into routers in the data path. This
signaling architecture enables easy installation and management of permission states. In
addition, this system is compatible with existing security protocols and the current Internet
architecture. By using a soft-state mechanism, PBS increases resilience against route and
state changes caused by router failure or link failure.
Chapter 3 presents Internet Cache on Wheels (ICOW) [11] in public transit systems.
ICOW aims to increase bandwidth availability and allow users to efficiently access web
applications and content in intermittently connected networks. By using a cache-based
system deployed on a vehicle, ICOW can decrease bandwidth usage by eliminating retrieval
of the same content from the Internet. The cache on a vehicle also works as a proxy,
so that ICOW can resolve a flash crowd problem that occurs at the beginning of each
network connection period. A popularity-based scheduling mechanism and a prefetching
mechanism decrease the content delivery delay. Furthermore, ICOW provides features that
increase system efficiency: it allows users to send requests even when there is no Internet
connection; it provides alternative cached content when requested content has not been
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
cached yet; and it provides the asynchronous notification of content availability so that
users can be automatically informed.
Chapter 4 describes a new system [12] that reduces energy consumption of mobile device
for service discovery processing while minimizing service discovery delay in highly mobile
environments. This system is a cross-layer architecture in the sense that it uses the infor-
mation provided by the data link layer for the application layer and the network layer. By
monitoring the changes of parameters of IEEE 802.11 network interfaces, this system allows
devices to detect when they join a new networking group. By using this detection mech-
anism, mobile devices do not need to frequently announce or browse services that others
provide, thus reducing energy consumptions.
Chapter 5 measures and analyzes the overhead of multicast service discovery traffic
in a campus wireless network [13]. As applications that use DNS-based service discovery
(DNS-SD) which runs over Multicast DNS (mDNS) become popular, the bandwidth usage
of multicast service discovery traffic increases. iTunes [14] is one of the most popular
applications that use DNS-SD/mDNS. Our evaluation shows that mDNS traffic consumes
13 % of total bandwidth in a wireless LAN, and about 69 % of the mDNS traffic comes from
iTunes. To the best of our knowledge, no other such measurement and analysis has been
published. In addition, to provide insights to design service discovery mechanism, we define
three different service discovery models and analyze them in terms of traffic overhead and
service discovery delay under different networking sizes and lifetimes.
Chapter 6 evaluates the control message overhead of Chord [15], one of the popular DHT-
based peer-to-peer lookup protocols, using simulation and analysis [16]. It also describes
the minimal update period that ensures the stability of the system. The result shows that
when the residence time of each user is one hour and the targeted success rate for join
operation is 0.98, the control message overhead (12.5 kb/sec) of Chord system is about 22 %
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Chapter 2
PBS: signaling architecture for
network traffic authorization
2.1 Introduction
Currently, the Internet architecture allows any node to inject IP packets into the network
without requiring explicit permission from the intended receiver. This paradigm has served
the Internet well, mostly for the purposes of data “push” (e.g., email), data “pull” (e.g., file
downloads) and interactive applications (e.g., VoIP). As Internet usage and applications
have increased over the past decade, this simple architecture has also, however, enabled
misuse of the network itself. Indeed, it has made Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks possible.
DoS attacks have become a particular problem since so-called botnets have made it possible
for remote attackers to commandeer end systems and use them to disrupt communication.
Reports on network security threats published by Symantec [2] estimate an average of
6,110 DoS attacks per day during the first six months of 2006. These reports also observed
an increase of the number of active botnet computers per day from 10,352 in 2005 to 52,771
in 2007. According to the reports, the number of bots observed in 2010 exceeds one million.
Arbor Networks [1] provided a bandwidth measurement of DDoS attacks, indicating a steady
growth. The largest observed attack size in 2009 was 49 gigabits per second.
Existing proposals on how to prevent DoS attacks can be classified in two ways. A
reactive approach monitors network traffic. If an attack is detected, the system takes an
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action to prevent the attack. Filtering-based approaches [4][18][5] fall into this category. A
proactive approach sets up a rule that all data flows between a sender and a receiver have to
follow. Data flows that violate the rule are simply dropped. SOS [6] and capability-based
approaches [19][20][7][21] are examples of proactive approaches.
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. An advantage of a reactive approach
is its ability to adapt its counter-attack strategy dynamically as it monitors on-going attacks.
However, there are two disadvantages in a reactive approach. It is not always possible
to differentiate legitimate packets from malicious packets [6], and by the time a reactive
algorithm detects and acts against an attack, the attacker might have already accomplished
his objective. In contrast, a proactive approach can prevent such an attack from taking
place preemptively by setting up appropriate system rules. However, such an approach
bears a risk of letting an attacker into the system if the attacker is able to circumvent the
rules. In addition, a proactive approach generates overhead to set up the rule and check
whether flows follow its rule. For example, capability-based approaches have the overhead of
setting up capability state and checking capabilities of flows. Neither reactive nor proactive
approach is effective against a compromised router.
We propose a new approach to prevent unauthorized traffic [9][10]. Our approach, called
Permission-Based Sending (PBS), is a hybrid of the proactive and reactive approaches,
combing the benefits of two approaches and mitigating their disadvantages at the same
time. The goal of PBS is to allow the legitimate senders to send data by granting per-
mission and drop the unauthorized packets by default. This enables “deny-by-default” in
computer networks. We use an explicit permission to give legitimate users the authority
to send (proactive approach), and use a monitoring mechanism to detect and react against
attacks (reactive approach). The explicit permission allows differentiation of benign traffic
from malicious one, and can limit the severity of attacks. The monitoring mechanism can
provide a second line of defense against malicious traffic, which may have circumvented the
permission-based mechanism.
To implement our hybrid approach, we developed a secure and robust signaling archi-
tecture. In this architecture, the end hosts send signaling messages along the path of data
flow in order to install permission states into the routers in the path. This is called on-path
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signaling. The signaling messages also contain information about traffic volume that can be
used for network monitoring. To securely set up the permission state, signaling messages
are protected end-to-end against alternation using digital signature. The channel security
(TLS and DTLS) is used hop-by-hop for integrity and confidentiality of signaling messages.
The soft-state mechanism of PBS supports the robustness against the state changes. Data
packets use IPsec to authenticate the origin.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes various
attack models. We discuss related work in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we give an overview
of PBS. We describe PBS NSLP message format in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, we provide
the architecture and implementation details. We evaluate performance in Section 2.7. In
Section 2.8, we compare the attack handling by PBS to other capability-based mechanisms.
We discuss deployment in Section 2.9. Finally, we discuss future work in Section 2.10.
2.2 Attack models
There are two kinds of DoS attacks; on-path attack and off-path attack. An on-path attack
is one where an attacker is in the data path. For example, a compromised router is an on-
path attacker. Off-path attack is one where an attacker inserts attack packets into the data
path, but is not on the data path himself. The attacker either spoofs the source address or
uses its own address.
We categorize networks into two types; namely, trustworthy networks and Byzantine
networks. In the trustworthy network, we need to only consider attacks from end users,
and routers are not compromised. In the Byzantine network, we trust neither the sender
nor the routers.
2.2.1 Trustworthy networks
Since the network is trustworthy, routers are not compromised. Thus, there is no on-path
attack. However, an off-path attacker may insert bogus packets into the data path. The
off-path attacker can spoof the address of one of the legitimate senders.
CHAPTER 2. PBS: SIGNALING ARCHITECTURE FOR NETWORK TRAFFIC
AUTHORIZATION 10
2.2.2 Byzantine networks
There are three possible on-path attacks in Byzantine networks; namely, packet addition
attacks, packet drop attacks, and packet replacement attacks. In a packet addition attack,
a compromised router inserts bogus packets by spoofing one of the legitimate senders’
addresses. The bogus packets have the same 5-tuple 1 as that of legitimate packets. In a
packet drop attack, a compromised router drops legitimate packets. It drops all packets or
selected packets (e.g., every nth packet). In a replacement attack, a compromised router
replaces the content of legitimate packets. The off-path attacker can inject bogus packets
into the data path. The attacker can spoof the address of one of the legitimate senders.
2.3 Related work
Capability-based mechanisms, such as Capabilities [19], SIFF [20], TVA [7] and Portcullis [21],
use explicit permission, called capability. Data packets carry a capability, a collection of
path specific information that is inserted by routers using a keyed hash algorithm. The
capability is granted by the receiver. Thus, the packets that do not have the capability are
dropped at routers. However, if an off-path attacker who spoofs a legitimate sender’s ad-
dress is in the same subnet and obtains the capabilities through eavesdropping, the attacker
can inject the attack packets using the capabilities. Furthermore, these mechanisms can be
compromised by the on-path attacker. Compromised routers can reveal the capability to
the upstream nodes, so these nodes can use the capability. In addition, the compromised
router can use its capability to inject an attack flow or it can drop legitimate packets.
SOS [6] uses an overlay structure to hide secret servlets (hidden proxies) which verify
the legitimacy of packets. Thus, the attack flows that do not know the secret servlets’
identification are dropped at a filer that is installed before the receiver. However, overlay
structure can be the target of the attackers. Furthermore, since all packets are relayed to
the servlet node, they incur a significant cost of media relaying.
Pushback [4] is an aggregate-based filtering mechanism. A router asks upstream routers
15-tuple is the sequence of 5 elements of a flow: source IP address, destination IP address, source port
number, destination port number, and protocol.
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to rate-limit an aggregate that causes congestion of the link. It cannot differentiate attack
packets and “poor” packets (that are under the attack). If the legitimate packets and
attack packets are in the same edge network, the legitimate packets are also dropped by
rate-limiting.
StopIt [18] is filter-based DoS defense system. It installs filters at StopIt servers through
request messages when there is an attack. If a StopIt server discovers that a sender is
misbehaving, it sends a StopIt request to the sender, and a StopIt server will filter the
flow from the sender. However, it requires modifying BGP to announce the StopIt servers’
addresses. It does not effectively prevent on-path attacks, especially black hole attacks.
Furthermore, the flooding attacks have already affected the links and the destination before
the filtering is installed at StopIt servers.
Traceback [5] uses the probabilistic marking of packets by routers. The receiver recon-
structs the data path using the marking. This reconstruction supports finding an attack
packet flow. However, it suffers from implementation problems since there is no specific
field for tracking purposes in IPv4. In addition, a spoofed marking field can mislead path
reconstruction. Furthermore, a compromised router would likely overwrite the marking field
to reduce the probability that other routers mark.
NUTSS [22] presents an architecture for flow establishment using off-path and on-path
signaling. NUTSS mainly considers naming, addressing, preventing unwanted packets, and
middle box configuration. NUTSS also presents a capability-based mechanism to prevent
attacks. Thus, it has the same problems as capability-based approaches.
2.4 PBS overview
2.4.1 Design goal
There are five design requirements for PBS: it must be deployable, distributed, robust,
secure, and scalable.
PBS should work in the current Internet infrastructure without modifying core networks.
For example, it should not modify IP packet headers or TCP/UDP packet headers. Thus,
PBS uses signaling messages to set up and manage permission state, instead of piggybacking
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the permission information in the IP packet header or TCP/UDP packet header. PBS uses
existing security protocols, such as IPsec, TLS and digital signatures.
PBS should be a distributed system to eliminate the necessity of managing a central
server. Thus, the permission should be granted by the receiver for a flow. The permission
state is managed between the receiver and the sender along the data path by signaling. A
subset of routers keeps state for a data flow, and monitors whether the flow is authorized.
PBS should be robust in the face of changes, such as routing and permission. Soft-state
supports the robustness of the system. Thus, the permission state is periodically refreshed
by signaling messages. If the state is not refreshed, the permission state is eliminated.
The permission setup and management should be secure. The signaling messages that
install and modify the permission state and distribute cryptography keys should not be
forgeable. Data packets must be protected against alternation.
PBS should be scalable to be applicable in high-speed and large scale networks. In
PBS, PBS functionality does not need to be implemented in all routers. Thus, some of the
routers that have PBS functionality should properly handle the authorization of data flows.
In addition, the computational and signaling overhead should be small for scalability.
2.4.2 Explicit permission using signaling
For permission state setup and management, PBS uses a suite of IP signaling protocols
that have been developed by the IETF Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS) working group [23].
The reason that we use NSIS protocol suite is that it supports some design requirements
of PBS, such as on-path signaling, robustness against route changes, ability to work on the
current networking architectures, and scalability. As shown in Fig 2.1, the NSIS protocol
suite consists of two protocol layers on top of the transport layer: the NSIS Transport Layer
Protocol (NTLP) and NSIS Signaling Layer Protocols (NSLPs) [24][25].
The General Internet Signaling Transport (GIST) [26] implements NTLP. The main
purposes of GIST are to determine how to reach the next node along the data path (routing)
and deliver signaling messages to the peer (transport). GIST provides on-path signaling
by using underlying routing state information to deliver signaling messages along the data
path. GIST is robust to route changes because it detects the route change and informs the
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Figure 2.1: NSIS framework
NSLP layer about the changes (see [26] for more details). GIST works on top of the existing
transport layer protocols and reuses existing security protocols, so that it does not require
modification of current network protocols. According to Fu et al. [27] who evaluated the
performance of the GIST protocol, GIST scales well.
We developed a new NSLP, the PBS NSLP [10]. The NTLP (GIST) handles all incoming
signaling messages and it passes the PBS-related signaling messages to the PBS NSLP
layer. There are two message types in the PBS NSLP, namely Query (Q) and Permission
(P ) messages. The Query message is sent by a sender to request permission to send data,
specifying the volume of data. It contains the flow identification object, 5-tuple (source
IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, and protocol identifier),
describing a data flow. The Permission message is sent by the receiver who grants the
permission to the sender along the reverse path of the Query message. The reverse path is
set up by the GIST reverse routing state. The Permission message is used to set up (grant),
remove (revoke) and modify permission state for a flow. The Permission message contains
the flow identification, the allowed volume in bytes, the time limit for the permission, and
the refresh time for soft-state. The PBS nodes, which are routers and end hosts that have
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PBS functionality, store this information to keep track of permission states. The delivery of
signaling messages is performed hop-by-hop between the adjacent PBS nodes. The Query
and Permission messages are periodically transmitted to establish soft-state that enables
the detection of permission state and security algorithm changes.
PBS NSLP Sign ling Message
1









Figure 2.2: Basic operation of PBS NSLP —— FID: Flow identification; RV: The volume
of data that the sender requests; AV: The volume of data that the receiver grants; TTL:
Time limit for the permission; RT: refresh time for soft-state.
Fig. 2.2 shows how permissions are set up between a sender and a receiver. A sender
sends a receiver a Query message to request a permission. The receiver returns a Permission
messages to allow incoming data packets. After the permission state is set up between the
sender and the receiver, the sender can send the allowed volume of data to the receiver
during the time interval specified. The sender and receiver periodically sends Query and
Permission messages after each soft-state period T .
PBS supports the asymmetric transmission of Query and Permission messages. After
the permission state is set up, the Permission message can be sent when a receiver wants to
change (revoke and modify) the permission state and security mechanism without receiving
a Query message.
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2.4.3 Security of messages
Basic operation of prevention
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Figure 2.3: Basic operation of prevention —— PK: The certificate of a public key; Auth:
The authentication field (digital signature) that is encrypted by one’s private key; DF:
Defense object. It has solution field (the indicated solution against the attack), IPsec
AuthAlgo field (the cryptographic algorithm for the IPsec authentication field), a shared
key, and SPI value.
For secure permission state setup and management, PBS uses a public key cryptogra-
phy mechanism for the authentication and integrity of signaling messages. Each sender and
receiver generates a public/private key pair, and generates a digital signature by encrypting
the objects of signaling messages using its own private key (i.e., the sender encrypts the
objects of the Query message and the receiver encrypts the objects of the Permission mes-
sage). Each public key in the form of the X.509 certificate, which is certified by a certificate
authority, is distributed by a signaling message to the PBS nodes. The certificate is used
to bind a public key and a user name (which includes the common name, an email address
and an IP address). The Query message carries the sender’s public key and the Permission
message carries the receiver’s public key. To validate the authentication and integrity of
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the signaling messages, each PBS node decrypts the digital signature using the distributed
public key. The sequence number of the PBS NSLP message is used to prevent replay
attacks.
For the authentication and integrity of data packets, the IPsec Authentication Header
(AH) is used. The Permission message carries the shared key and security parameter index
(SPI), which are generated by the receiver and will be used for IPsec. When each PBS
node receives the Permission message, it stores the shared key and installs the security
association (SA). For each flow, the SA has field values for destination IP address, IPsec
protocol (AH or ESP) and SPI. To securely deliver the key and SPI value, channel security
(TLS or DTLS) is used between adjacent PBS nodes. PBS functionality allows PBS routers
to validate the IPsec header that uses transport mode between the two end hosts (sender
and receiver) using the shared key.
For the authentication data field in IPsec AH, the sender uses symmetric key cryptog-
raphy or public key cryptography. In symmetric key cryptography, the shared symmetric
key that is delivered in the Permission message is used for the encryption. The public key
cryptography method entails using the sender’s private key for encryption. The receiver
has the right to choose a cryptography algorithm for IPsec based on the policy, network
and applications, and this notification is carried in the Permission message.
Fig. 2.3 shows the secure two-way handshakes for permission state setup and how PBS
can prevent attack flows. Since the attacker does not have the shared key, the attack flow
failed during IPsec verification. Fig. 2.4 shows the permission state table, which is stored
in PBS routers, for each flow.
2.4.4 Monitoring and reaction against DoS attacks
Routers that do not have PBS functionality cannot generate bogus data packets because
they do not have the shared key. A compromised PBS router that knows the shared key,
however, can generate and insert attack packets when symmetric key cryptography is used
in IPsec AH. Furthermore, an off-path attacker (i.e., external attacker) might obtain the
shared key by controlling compromised PBS routers. Compromised routers, which may
or may not be PBS routers, can drop legitimate packets. To prevent the attacks in this
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Figure 2.4: Permission state table. The 5-tuple is the key in the hashtable. (AV: The
number of bytes that the receiver grants; TTL: Time limit for the permission; RT: The
refresh period; Solution: The indicated solution against the attack (change path, use public
key cryptography, etc); PK: The sender’s public key; SK: The shared key)
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Figure 2.5: Basic operation of the PBS Detection Algorithm (SV: The volume of data that
the sender has sent; Recv: The volume of data that the receiver has received; size: data
size)
Byzantine network, PBS requires monitoring of network traffic and detecting attacks. The
detection algorithm is called the PBS Detection Algorithm (PDA). PDA uses a soft-state
mechanism of PBS, where a sender periodically sends the Query message that contains the
volume of data it has sent after permission was granted. The receiver compares the volume
of data in the signaling message with the volume of data that has been received. If they
differ, the receiver suspects that there is an attack. Based on the detection, a receiver
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requests the senders to respond to the attack (using methods like changing the encryption
algorithm or changing the path) using the indication in the Permission message.
Fig. 2.5 shows the basic operation of PDA. We assume that the receiver grants permission
to the sender to send a flow of size 10 MB. After setting up the permission state, the sender
sends data packets whose total volume is 1 MB. Since a compromised router has the shared
key, it generates and sends attack packets whose total volume is 2 MB with the correct
IPsec header. After period T , the sender sends a Query message indicating that it has sent
1 MB of data. The receiver can detect the attack by comparing the volume (1 MB) in the
Query message and total volume of data (3 MB) that it has received. After the receiver
detects the attack, it sends the Permission messages with an indication to use public key
cryptography to generate the authentication field of IPsec header. After that, the attack
packets are dropped at a router because of the IPsec verification failure.
PDA can detect the packet dropping attacks by a compromised router. A compromised
router drops all packets (including signaling messages) or selected packets (e.g., every n
packets). As shown in Fig. 2.6(a), when a compromised router drops all packets, since the
sender does not receive a Permission message, the sender suspects that the packets have
been dropped. Therefore, it changes the path. As shown in Fig. 2.6(b), when a compromised
router drops some data packets, the amount of volume that the receiver has received and
the volume information in the Query message differ, so the receiver suspects that packets
have been dropped and sends a Permission message indicating a request to change path.
To change the path, the sender can use a relay node used for tunneling or path diversity by
multihoming. The method for path changes is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Data packet loss due to natural causes is also possible, and this is not an attack. Because
of PDA, the natural packet loss might be regarded as a dropping attack. To avoid this, we
apply a threshold-based decision scheme. If the difference between the amount of delivered
packets and the volume information in the Query message is within a defined threshold, this
is not regarded as a dropping attack. The threshold value can be defined by the receiver
based on the network environment. PDA can also detect the heavy congestion link where
there is significant packet loss.
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Figure 2.6: Detection of packet drop attack in PBS detection algorithm
2.5 The message format of PBS NSLP
A PBS NSLP message consists of a common header and type-length-value (TLV) objects.
All PBS NSLP messages carry a common header. Fig. 2.7(a) shows the common header
format.
2.5.1 Message format
Query messages have six objects: flow identification, message sequence number, requested
volume, sent volume, public key certificate, and authentication data. Permission messages
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Figure 2.7: Header format. Sizes are in bits. r represents a reserved bit.
have eight objects: flow identification, message sequence number, allowed volume, TTL,
refresh time, public key certificate, defense and authentication data. Fig. 2.8 and Fig. 2.9
show Query and Permission message format, respectively.
2.5.2 Object format
PBS NSLP objects begin with the common object header. Fig. 2.7(b) shows the common
object header format. The value of each object is defined as follows:
• Flow identification is a description of data flow. The information in it are source IP
address, destination IP address, protocol identifier, and source and destination port
number.
• Message sequence number is an increasing sequence number. It is used to prevent a
replay attack.
• Requested volume is the number of bytes that a sender requests for a flow.
• Sent volume is the number of bytes that a sender has sent since the sender received
the permission.
















Figure 2.8: PBS NSLP Query message format. V is IP address version (version 4 or 6).
• Allowed volume is the number of bytes that a receiver allows for a flow.
• TTL is the permission state timeout period.
• Refresh Time is the refresh timeout period for the soft-state.
• Public Key Certificate is the X.509 certificate of a node’s public key.
• Defense has three values: solution, IPsec authentication algorithm and IPsec Key.
















Figure 2.9: PBS NSLP Permission message format. Sol is solution value (1=No action,
2=IPsec with symmetric key cryptogrpahy for a flow, 3=IPsec with public key cryptography
for a flow, and 4=Change the path to avoid the compromised router) and Auth is IPsec
authentication algorithm.
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Solution indicates the approach to be used against an attack, such as use IPsec with
symmetric key cryptography for a flow, use IPsec with public key cryptography for
a flow, and change the path to avoid the compromised router. IPsec authentication
algorithm is the cryptography algorithm for the IPsec authentication field. IPsec key
is the key for the IPsec authentication field.
• Authentication data is the encrypted data of message fields for authentication and
integrity. Public key is used for the encryption.
More details about the signaling message formats and PBS NSLP specification can be found
in the Internet draft [10].





























Figure 2.10: PBS implementation
PBS has three components: on-path (path-coupled) signaling, authorization, and traffic
management. We have implemented the components of PBS. Fig. 2.10 shows our PBS
implementation architecture.
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2.6.1 On-path signaling
On-path signaling is used to install and manage permission state at the sender, routers and
the receiver in a hop-by-hop fashion between routers that have a PBS functionality. PBS
NSLP and GIST are included in this component.
We are building PBS NSLP on the GIST implementation by Fu et al. [28]. GIST
implementation provides the channel reliability (C-mode) and security (TLS). PBS NSLP
states are managed by a finite state machine (FSM). Fig. 2.11 shows the FSM of PBS
NSLP. PBS NSLP parses and creates signaling messages at each node. OpenSSL [29] is
used for implementing cryptography algorithms and processing X.509 certificates. The
communication between GIST and PBS NSLP is performed by Unix sockets.
2.6.2 Authorization
The authorization component decides whether to grant permission and timeout period for
a flow. Another main objective of this component is to detect and identify attacks. Based
on the detected and identified attack, this component decides what a sender should do to
prevent the attacks, such as using public key cryptography for IPsec authentication field or
changing the data path.
Authorization manages the permission and IPsec state table for each flow. Those tables
are implemented as a hashtable.
2.6.3 Traffic management
The traffic management component handles all incoming packets, including signaling mes-
sages and data packets. It passes signaling messages up to the on-path signaling component.
Based on the permission state of a flow that is stored in routers aware of PBS functionality,
the traffic manager screens the data packets to see whether the data packets are authorized.
An IP packet filter is used to filter the unauthorized packets. The IPsec header is verified
in this component. To see whether the flow exceeds the given permission, this component
monitors the volume of the data flow that it has received since the permission state was set
up.
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We implement a user space IPsec module which is a modular IPsec stack that relies on
user space by using netfilter [30]. libiptc interfaces filter tables in the kernel space and
iptables filters IP packets. netfilter queue module gets the packets to a user space if a
rule matches. We set up Linux routing tables using route.
2.7 Performance evaluation
Since PBS is intended to be deployed in high-speed networks, we need to show the scalability
of PBS; scalability is one of the design goals of PBS. We measure the traffic overhead, the
CPU usage, memory overhead, and setup delays. Fig. 2.12 shows the testbed setup for
performance measurement. The machines are running Linux with kernel version 2.6.23,
have AMD Opteron 2.2 GHz CPUs, and 2 GB RAM each.
2.7.1 Traffic overhead
2.7.1.1 Signaling message overhead
The signaling overhead can be determined by the size of signaling message and frequency
of the messages. There are two kinds of signaling messages: NSLP and NTLP messages. In
PBS NSLP, Query and Permission messages are the NSLP messages.
The total generated NSLP messages during a permission session, Lnslp, is




where LQ is the size of Query message, LP is the size of Permission message, TL is the
lifetime of the session, and TP is the soft-state period of NSLP.
Table 2.1 shows the message size of PBS NSLP signaling of NSIS layer. The size de-
pends on the X.509 certificate size that the signaling messages carry and the symmetric
key size that the Permission messages carry. We vary the public key algorithms for the
authentication field of signaling message. The three public key algorithms have the same
security level (80-bit security level). The signaling message overhead also depends on the
protocol header sizes.
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Table 2.1: PBS NSLP signaling message size —— The first column of the table represents
the public key cryptography for the authentication field of the signaling message. HMAC-
SHA1 is used for symmetric key that the Permission messages carry.




The total generated NSIS signaling message during a permission session, Lsignal, is the
sum of the total generated NSLP messages and GIST messages (see [27] for the GIST
message sizes).





where L is the total data size including headers of link layer, network layer, and transport
layer protocol. Thus, L is





where Ld is the size of data message, Np is the number of packets for the original data
message, Lheader is the sum of the header size of all layer protocols, and MSS is the maximum
segment size.
We assume that the permission state is set up for a flow of streaming video using UDP.
The size of the flow is 4 GB and the running time of the flow is 90 minutes. Thus, the
permission state lasts for 90 minutes. We assume that the soft-state periods of PBS NSLP
and GIST are 60 seconds. Table 2.2 shows the bandwidth usage of the signaling messages
during the permission session and signaling message overhead ratio.
2.7.1.2 Data message overhead
When attacks are detected or the receiver increases the security level of data transmission,
senders add IPsec header into packets. Thus, there is IPsec header packet overhead. The
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Table 2.2: Bandwidth and signaling overhead ratio for 4 GB video streaming whose running
time is 90 minutes




data packet overhead by IPsec, Loverhead, is
Loverhead = Np × Lipsec,
where Np is the number of packets for the original data message and Lipsec is the size of
IPsec AH.





where L is the total data size including headers of link layer, network layer and transport
layer protocol. Table 2.3 shows the size of IPsec AH and data message overhead ratio based
on the cryptography algorithms. It shows that the message overhead by IPsec header is
small.
Table 2.3: IPsec AH size —— The first column of the table represents the algorithm for
the authentication data field of IPsec AH. Overhead ratio is for the 4 GB video streaming.






We measure the CPU usage to handle signaling messages at a router. Since the sender
generates only a few sessions at a time, the CPU usage of a sender is not a problem. Since
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the receiver can dynamically increase the number of servers based on the CPU usage using
load balancing algorithms, the CPU usage of signaling messages for a receiver may not
be a problem. Thus, we mainly consider the router’s CPU usage. Fig. 2.13 shows the
CPU usage of PBS signaling message handling. The CPU usages of PBS NSLP layer with
different transport layer protocols and security protocols are the same since the signaling
message delivery and channel security are performed at the GIST layer and the NSLP layer
is for the signaling message verification and parsing. However, the CPU usage varies based
on the transmission protocol and security protocol in the GIST layer. The CPU usage is
the lowest when UDP is used and the highest when TLS is used. Even though TLS is
used for the delivery of Query and Permission messages, the router can handle 600 Query
and 600 Permission messages per second. It means that if the period of soft-state in PBS
NSLP is 60 seconds (short stream flows whose lifetime is less than 60 seconds get one-time
permission), the router can handle 36,000 sessions concurrently.
Lee et al. [31] measured the network flows at the edge routers of University of Auckland
in 2006. They show the average flow departure rate and lifetime of flows. By using their
data and Little’s law and assuming that arrival rate and departure rate are the same, we
can get the average number of concurrent flows, which is 10,000 flows, and the maximum
number of concurrent flows, which is 20,000 flows. Thus, PBS can be applied to the edge
router. Since the computer that we used for our performance evaluation is old and slow, if
we test the CPU usage at a faster CPU, the CPU usage can be lower and the router can
handle more signaling messages.
2.7.3 Memory overhead
Since PBS is based on permission state, there is a memory usage overhead for storing
permission state and session key for each flow.
2.7.3.1 Session key
The memory size for storing session keys depends on the key size and concurrent number of
sessions. If there are 10,000 concurrent sessions, then session key storage requires 0.2 MB for
HMAC-SHA1 and 1.28 MB for RSA-1024. Table 2.4 shows the key sizes of the cryptography
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algorithms.
Table 2.4: Key sizes in bytes
HMAC-SHA1 RSA-1024 DSA-1024 ECC-192
Key size 20 128 128 24
2.7.3.2 State table
A router stores a permission state and IPsec state for each flow. The state is managed by
hashtables. If we assume that each flow requires 100 bytes for storing the state, it only
requires 1MB with 10,000 concurrent sessions. Therefore, memory usage for PBS is not a
problem.
2.7.4 Delay
2.7.4.1 Round trip time of signaling message
Because a sender has to get permission before sending data packets, there is one round-trip
delay before sending the data packets. Fig. 2.14 shows the round-trip delay of permission
setup.
The one-hop delay of Query and Permission message deliver, Tquery and Tpermission, are
Tquery = Tgist + Tqtx + Tqpr
Tpermission = Tptx + Tppr,
where Tgist is the GIST handshake delay, Tqtx is the sum of transmission delay and prop-
agation delay of the Query message, Tqpr is the Query message processing delay , Tptx is
the sum of transmission and propagation delay of the Permission message, and Tppr is the
Permission message processing delay. There is no GIST handshake delay in the Permission
message delivery since GIST handshake was already performed during the delivery of the
Query message. Thus, the total round-trip time, RTT , is
RTT = (Tquery + Tpermission)× (Nr + 1),
where Nr is the number of routers that have a PBS functionality.
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Table 2.5: Processing delay based on public keys. UDP is used for the transport layer
protocol. NULL indicates that we do not use any cryptographic algorithm.





Table 2.6: Processing delay when RSA-1024 is used for authentication field —— The first
row of the table represents the transport layer protocol to deliver signaling messages
Query (msec) Permission (msec) GIST handshake (msec)
UDP 0.423 0.436 0.411
TCP 0.429 0.429 10.057
TLS 0.523 0.523 23.383
Because the propagation delay depends on the physical link and the transmission de-
lay depends on the network link, we focus on the processing delay which depends on the
PBS functionality, including cryptographic algorithms. Since signaling messages have the
authentication field generated by the public key, the verification of the authentication at a
router increases the processing delay. Table 2.5 shows the processing delay of Query and
Permission message at a router. The processing delay of signaling message when RSA-1024
is used is the smallest.
Table 2.6 shows the processing delay and GIST handshake delay by protocols. Processing
delays when UDP and TCP are used are almost same. However, when TLS is used, since
the message is encrypted by a session key, decryption is required for signaling messages.
Thus, the processing delay when TLS is used is the largest. GIST handshake delays differ
among protocols since TCP requires a TCP session setup delay and TLS requires additional
TLS session handshakes.
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Table 2.7: IPsec processing delay with cryptographic algorithms.
Parameters IPsec processing delay (msec)






2.7.4.2 IPsec processing delay
Table 2.7 shows the IPsec processing delay at a router. We compared the IPsec processing
delay based on the cryptographic algorithms, and compared the IP packet forwarding delay
with and without user space IPsec module. NULL encryption means that there is no
encryption for IPsec AH authentication field, but the packets go through the user space
IPsec module. Due to the high delay of public key cryptography algorithm, the public key
cryptography algorithms are not suitable for delay sensitive applications, such as VoIP. The
algorithms should be used only for highly secure and non-delay-sensitive applications.
2.8 Analysis of PBS
2.8.1 Attacks handled by PBS
We address the solution of PBS for the attacks that we discussed in Section 2.2.
2.8.1.1 Trustworthy networks
When an off-path attacker does not spoof the address, the attack packets can be dropped
at a router by checking the 5-tuple of the packets since they do not have permission.
Existing capability-based mechanisms [7][20][19] suffer from the spoofing attack in the
same subnet. When an off-path attacker spoofs a legitimate sender’s address in the same
subnet and obtains the capabilities through eavesdropping, the attacker can inject attack
packets using the capabilities. However, PBS can prevent this attack because the authenti-
CHAPTER 2. PBS: SIGNALING ARCHITECTURE FOR NETWORK TRAFFIC
AUTHORIZATION 32
cation of sender is protected by the security mechanism of PBS, IPsec. Because the network
is assumed to be trustworthy, symmetric key cryptography algorithm for IPsec is a good
solution for this attack.
2.8.1.2 Byzantine networks
In Byzantine networks, off-path attacks can be detected by PDA. If the attacker does not
spoof the packet source address, the attack packets are dropped at a router by checking the
permission. If the attacker spoofs the source address, PDA detects the attack and IPsec for
data packet can prevent the attacks.
Unlike trustworthy networks, in Byzantine networks, routers can be compromised. Ex-
isting capability-based mechanisms [7][20][19] can be compromised by on-path attackers.
The compromised routers that have the capability can announce it to the upstream nodes,
so these upstream nodes can use it. In addition, the compromised routers can use the
capability to generate and inject attack flows, and they can also drop legitimate packets.
However, PBS can detect the packet injection and dropping, as described in Section 2.4.4.
Since the compromised router has a session key, IPsec using symmetric key cryptography
cannot prevent the attack. Thus, public key cryptography should be applied for the authen-
tication field of IPsec AH. To avoid a compromised router that drops legitimate packets,
the data flow path needs to be changed. To change the data path, a relay node used for
tunneling can be used or path diversity through multihoming can be used.
PDA can detect all attacks except for a replacement attack because PDA is based on
comparing the volume of data. In the packet replacement attack, the attacker does not
generate or drop the packets, but changes the content of the packet. Thus, this attack
cannot be detected by PDA. One solution to prevent this attack is to encrypt messages
using public key cryptographic algorithm. However, it requires computational overhead.
Therefore, this message security should be applied minimally. However, if the network
system requires high-end security, such as a military system, the message security to every
message is required even though the computational overhead is high.
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2.8.2 Security issues
2.8.2.1 Permission granting process
The permission granting process depends on the policy of the receiver. In PBS, we assume
that the receiver has a white list and a black list. The sender in a white list can get the
permission, but the sender in a black list cannot get the permission from the receiver. This
white and black listing, however, has an introduction problem. The introduction problem
is on deciding whether the receiver gives the permission to the sender, who is not on either
of the lists. In the current PBS system, we assume that anonymous user will get limited
permission until the receiver suspects that the user is not an attacker.
2.8.2.2 Fairness for requesting permission
An attacker can send a lot of signaling messages to make the PBS router incur computational
overhead to validate them. To resolve this problem, PBS can use existing mechanisms, such
as Portcullis [21] which uses a puzzle-based mechanism for per-computation fairness. Since
a sender has to spend its CPU time to solve a puzzle before requesting capability, the
Portcullis system can provide fairness.
2.8.3 Detection delay and number of attack flows
Since some of the attack flows can pass the router and reach the receiver before the at-
tack flows are detected by PDA, we need to decrease the number of attack flows. As the
attack flows are detected quickly, the number of attack flows decreases. As discussed in
Section 2.4.4, the soft-state period of signaling messages is the important metric to analyze
the delay of detecting the circumvented attacks. Periodic Query messages carry the infor-
mation of the volume of data that the sender has sent. To detect attacks, this information
is compared to the volume of data the receiver has actually received. Therefore, the delay
of detecting attack flows by PDA depends on this period of Query messages. We analyze
how the soft-state period affects the number of attack flows, and how PDA can reduce the
number of attack flows.
We assume that the attack flow arrival rate at the receiver, λa, and the legitimate flow
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arrival rate, λl, follow Poisson distribution. Thus, the total flow arrival rate at the receiver,
λ, is the sum of the two arrival rates. From Little’s law, we can find the average number of








where E[Ta] is the expected lifetime of attack flows and E[Tl] is the expected lifetime
of legitimate flows. We assume that the attack flows continue until they are detected and
terminated by PDA. Thus, the lifetime of attack flows in the system is equal to the detection
delay. Let the soft-state period of signaling message, TP , be Tl/α where α is equal to or
larger than one. Since the attack flow arrival time follows uniform distribution on the soft-
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where r is the ratio of attack flow arrival rate over total flow arrival rate (r = λa/λ).
Fig. 2.15 shows the attack flow ratio, R, with various r and α. In the figure, even
though attack flow arrival rate ratio is 0.8 (i.e., attack flow arrival rate is much larger
than legitimate flow arrival rate), the attack flow ratio is less than 0.2 when α is 10. This
result shows the small soft-state period decreases the detection delay, and because of the
detection, the number of attack flows is reduced. There is, however, a trade-off between
detection delay and signaling overhead (message and processing overhead). As the period
decreases, the signaling overhead increases.
2.8.4 Robustness against route changes
Route changes, which occur through router failure, link failure, or router restart, are un-
predictable in real network environments and they decrease the performance of systems.
The existing capability-based systems are based on the hard state protocol in the way that
explicit communication terminates the state when failures are detected. However, as Lui et
al. [32] demonstrated, soft-state mechanisms outperform hard state mechanisms in reality
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when network conditions are unpredictable. In PBS, the soft-state of GIST can detect the
route change and inform the PBS NSLP about the changes, so the flow session can be set
up at the new router. Furthermore, the soft-state of PBS NSLP messages is used to detect
route changes. The new router, which gets the new PBS Query and Permission message,
updates the permission state. The old router, which does not get the signaling messages
for the flow, removes the permission state of the flow after a soft-state period.
2.9 Deployment and application
To effectively prevent attacks, at least one PBS router should be placed between the attacker
and the receiver. If a receiver-side edge router has PBS functionality, the edge router can
properly handle the attacks even though the attack packets are generated in the backbone
area. If a sender-side edge router has PBS functionality, the attacks from the sender side can
be prevented near the attacker. Thus, installing the PBS functionality at the edge router
can effectively prevent the attacks that are generated in the middle of the path. However,
the current PBS system is unable to handle the case where the receiver-side edge router is
compromised. If the compromised edge router starts sending attack packets, these would
reach the receiver.
PBS is based on deny-by-default. Thus, in the case when all end-users are supposed to
have to have PBS functionality, the packets that do not have permission will be dropped at
the router. However, for short stream flows, such as DNS and ICMP, the cost in terms of
flow state setup delay and signaling message overhead is high. Thus, PBS is not applicable
to these short stream flows. The short stream flows can be rate-limited, and the rate-limiting
can reduce the effect of attacks by flooding the short streaming data.
In the case that some end users do not have PBS functionality, the packets that do not
have PBS functionality will be rate-limited. Therefore, those packets without permission
will be treated as short stream flows.
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2.10 Future work
2.10.1 Attacks on core routers
PBS can be deployed on edge routers, so that it can efficiently prevent attacks on end
users. On the other hand, it is hard to deploy PBS functionality at core routers because
verification of permission state for flows at core routers has computational overhead. Thus,
the PBS system can suffer from attacks on core routers. For example, if attack flows are
generated on core routers to harm other core routers, PBS cannot prevent these attacks
because the attack flows do not pass the edge routers that have PBS functionality or have
already harmed core routers before passing PBS edge routers. Hence, the PBS system needs
a mechanism to reduce overhead at core routers. Probabilistically selecting routers to verify
permission state for flows might be one possible solution.
2.10.2 Replacement attacks
If compromised routers replace the content of data packets when symmetric key cryp-
tography algorithm is used for the authentication field in IPsec, PBS cannot detect the
replacement because the PBS detection algorithm is based on checking the volume of data.
To prevent this replacement attack, public key cryptography algorithm should be used for
IPsec, but this incurs high overhead for verification. Hence, we need an algorithm to detect
the replacement attacks of compromised routers while reducing computational overhead for
verification.
2.11 Conclusion
We developed PBS, a signaling architecture for network traffic authorization. PBS supports
secure permission state setup and management and is robust against route changes. PBS
works within the current networking architecture, using existing transport protocols (UDP
or TCP) and security protocols (public key cryptography, TLS/DTLS, and IPsec).
Our analysis shows that the PBS detection algorithm (PDA) can efficiently detect var-
ious kinds of attacks regardless of network type. Based on the detected and identified
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attacks, PBS suggests solutions such as using stronger cryptography algorithm for IPsec or
changing the data path to the senders that are affected by the attack. Our performance
evaluation shows that PBS scales well.
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(b) Receiver (State 1: Idle, 2: Permission decision, 3: Permis-
sion state, 4: IPsec verification, 5: Compare RV and AV, 6:



























(c) Router (State 1: Idle, 2: Wait for P, 3: Permission state, 4:
IPsec verification, 5: Compare RV and AV)
Figure 2.11: Finite state machine (Event || Action) (Q: Query message, P: Permission
message, T.O.: Time out, AV: The number of bytes that the receiver allows, SV: The
number of bytes that the sender has sent, RV: The number of bytes that the node has
received)

























Figure 2.12: Testbed. The router has two network interfaces: one interface is connected to
senders’ subnet, and the other interface is connected to receivers’ subnet.
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(c) CPU usage of NSIS
Figure 2.13: CPU usage of PBS at a router when RSA-1024 is used for public key cryptog-
raphy. The x-axis represents the rate of Query and Permission message pairs per second.
For example, 400 means that the router handles 400 Query messages and 400 Permission
messages per second.
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Figure 2.14: Round-trip delay of permission state setup
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Figure 2.15: Attack flow ratio
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Chapter 3
Internet Cache on Wheels
(ICOW): Internet access in public
transit systems
3.1 Introduction
Providing Internet access to passengers makes public transit more attractive as an alterna-
tive to commuting or traveling by car. Thus, many public transit organizations are trying
to provide such access. There are several options:
1 They can install wireless routers on transit vehicles that combine a 3G or 4G cellular
data interface with local IEEE 802.11 connectivity. This option is becoming common
for long-distance travel coaches. However, transit operators or passengers have to pay
for the cellular data service and the bandwidth per passenger is low.
2 In the future, 4G networks may become sufficiently ubiquitous and cheap so that
individual passengers can use their own devices, such as smartphones or tablets, but
it is unlikely that Internet access in subways will occur before 2020 in many countries.
3 They can install WLAN access points at bus stops and train stations, allowing con-
nectivity for passengers. However, since such connectivity may only last for a short
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time within limited network coverage of an access point, passengers would experience
only an intermittently connected network service. Despite this intermittent network
service, the free service encourages passengers to use this WLAN network.
This thesis focuses on the last option, developing a low-cost way for public transit
systems to access web applications and content. When passengers carry a hand-held mobile
device which is equipped with a WLAN interface, they can freely use Internet service
without activating a cellular data plan. This option is suitable for public transit systems in
dense urban area where the distance between stops is short. This option can, in particular,
be used in subway systems where there is no cellular network connectivity. Even though
in some metropolitan cities in Asia, such as Seoul and Tokyo, network service providers
provide cellular connection in subway, some cities in America and Europe, such as New
York City and London, do not offer cellular connectivity.
These intermittently connected networks suffer from resource limitations, especially net-
work connection period and bandwidth limitation. When requests for content are not han-
dled during a network connection period because the stopping time is not long enough,
the non-handled requests need to be queued until the next stop. This increases content
retrieval delay. In addition, there is a flash crowd problem at the beginning of network
connection period because passengers simultaneously try to access the network when they
get Internet connectivity. These simultaneous attempts cause network contention problems
that degrade link throughput.
We propose Internet Cache on Wheels (ICOW) [11] for Internet content in public transit
systems. ICOW is a cache-based system that can be deployed on a transit vehicle. This
cache avoids retrieving the same content twice from the Internet during a network connection
period. Hence, it reduces network resource usage. Secondly, by placing this smart cache
on a vehicle and allowing it to work as a proxy node, this system resolves the network
contention problem.
ICOW is not only a simple caching system, it also provides functions to increase band-
width availability, increase system efficiency, and decrease content delivery delay. The core
features that the ICOW system provides are as follows:
• Increase bandwidth availability. The ICOW system provides a channel divi-
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sion mechanism that eliminates single channel interference and a request aggregation
mechanism that reduces bandwidth usage.
• Increase system efficiency. The ICOW system queues requests. This queuing
mechanism allows passengers to send requests even in the absence of an Internet
connection. ICOW also provides related cached web content to passengers when their
requested content has not yet been cached. The asynchronous notification of content
availability in the ICOW system makes the system easier to use in the sense that
passengers do not need to check repeatedly whether the requested content is available.
• Decrease content delivery delay. The ICOW system schedules requested content
retrieval. When the network connecting time is not long enough to handle all requests,
some requests might be handled during the next connecting period. To decrease
this content delivery delay, ICOW applies popularity-based scheduling, and it also
prefetches related content.
In this chapter, we describe our design of the system architecture and implementation
of the system. Our performance evaluation shows that ICOW obtains more content in a
given time than a direct access system (where each passenger directly connects to an AP)
when the number of passengers is above a certain number. We analytically show that our
system supports the distribution of network resource use in time domain and reduces the
bandwidth usage during network connection periods. Our simulation results show that
our popularity-based scheduling algorithm reduces average content delivery delay while
simplifying implementation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we define a public
transportation model that we use. In Section 3.3, we describe some of the issues that need
to be addressed in this public transportation model. We discuss related work in Section 3.4.
We provide our approaches to resolve the problems in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, we show
architecture and implementation details. Finally, we evaluate the system performance in
Section 3.7.
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Figure 3.1: Public transit system. The dotted line presents the network coverage of an AP.
3.2 Public transit network access model
We define a public transit model for intermittent network access where dwell time (standing
time), running time and passenger travel time are the major parameters. Fig. 3.1 shows
the public transit model.
3.2.1 Stops and stations
We assume that every bus stop, subway stop, or train station is equipped with an access
point (AP). These APs provide Internet access service to passengers while the bus or train
is within the vicinity of the AP. When passengers are within the network coverage of an AP,
it is called a network connection period. Otherwise, they are in a network disconnection
period.
3.2.2 Passenger
We assume that passengers carry handheld mobile devices or laptop computers which con-
tain an IEEE 802.11 wireless network interface card (NIC). They greedily access the Internet
such as web applications while a bus or train is within the vicinity of the AP at stops. They
can find whether they are in the network coverage of an AP either by checking signal
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strength or by using other network scanning tools to find an AP. The bandwidth between
passengers and an AP is limited, and the amount of data that passengers can upload and
download through an AP depends on the vehicle stopping period. The passengers’ travel
time is limited, so they get off after passing some random numbers of stops.
3.2.3 Vehicle
In our discussion, we refer to vehicles as any kind of public transit vehicles, such as a bus,
subway, light rail, ferry, or train. Vehicles make frequent stops to pick up and discharge
passengers.
3.3 Problems
In this section, we describe the problems that occur in public transit network access. Since
passengers can access web content when a transit vehicle is within the vicinity of access
points, they would experience interrupted Internet connection. Thus, this public transit
network is an intermittently connected network.
3.3.1 Network resource limitation
We measured bus stop and travel time in New York City with the results shown in Fig. 3.2(b).
We consider New York City typical of a dense metropolitan area. The result indicates that
the average bus dwell time is much lower than the average bus travel time: the average bus
dwell time is 26 seconds while the average bus travel time between two stops is 65.4 seconds.
Because a network connection is established when a bus is approaching a bus stop and after
it starts moving, we measured the average network connection period by setting up a laptop
computer with an external antenna at a bus stop and carrying another laptop computer on
a bus. We assume that every bus stop has an AP. The measurement result indicates that
the network connection period is 16 seconds larger than the bus dwell time. Hence, the aver-
age network connection period is about 42 seconds while the average network disconnection
period is about 49.4 seconds.
This measurement raises an important problem, limited network resources. Passengers
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(a) MTA M104 bus route, Manhat-
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Figure 3.2: Bus stop and travel time measured in Manhattan, New York City in November
2009. Average bus dwell time is 26 sec and average bus travel time between stops is 65.4 sec.
can use network connection only when vehicles are within the network coverage of an AP
at each stop. Because of this limited network connection time, some of passengers would
experience that they cannot use the Internet when many other passengers use the Internet,
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so that they should wait until the next stop (in this measurement, they wait 49.4 seconds) to
use the Internet. This interrupted connectivity increases the delay to use web applications
such as reading online newspapers.
3.3.2 Network throughput degradation
At the beginning of a network connection period, passengers try to simultaneously establish
a link-layer connection to an AP at a stop and use web applications. This simultaneous con-
nections cause network contention and result in degrading the overall network link through-
put. It is worth noting that the network throughput, especially in the contention-based
medium access technique like IEEE 802.11 WLAN, is significantly affected by the number
of contending nodes. The authors of [33][34] analyzed the throughput in the IEEE 802.11
Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) mechanism and showed that the throughput de-
grades as the number of contending nodes increases. When one node occupies radio resource
to transmit its frame, other contending nodes should wait for the next transmission oppor-
tunity to send their frame. The next transmission opportunity is randomly chosen between
the range of 0 and current contention window size which is exponentially increased when-
ever the nodes fail to win the medium in a transmission opportunity. Upon contending
to transmit a frame, the contention window size (by default, the initial contention size is
31) exponentially increases until it reaches the maximum size 1023. Therefore, the average
backoff period increases as contention increases. As a result, link throughput degrades by
about 25 % as the number of contending node increases from 1 to 40 when each node has
the same transmission opportunity.
To confirm these results, we simulated the impact of contention on throughput using the
OPNET simulator [35]. Fig. 3.3 depicts the throughput variation over a 40 second simulation
time as the number of contending nodes (N) changes across the set, N = {1, 10, 20, 30, 40}.
In this simulation, we fixed the channel data rate (CR) as 11 Mb/s and made each N
nodes individually start to download a chunk of content of size S = 30 Mbytes from a
server through a single TCP session using the FTP GET command. Simulation result shows
that the wireless link provides less throughput as the number of users who compete for the
bandwidth increases. Compared to the result of N = 1, the throughput degrades about 11 %
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and 25 % for N = 20 and N = 40, respectively, when the link is saturated (after 10 seconds).
This simulation result shows that the throughput degradation is not negligible, especially































Figure 3.3: The effect of contention on throughput of N FTP GET flows. Channel rate is
11 Mb/s. Each requested content is 30 Mbytes.
3.4 Related work
Cache-based systems. 7DS [36], the earlier project developed, aims to provide systems
for web access to retrieve information and message delivery in intermittently connected
networks. This system allows mobile devices to exchange cached information and deliver
messages in a highly mobile environment. Even though there is no Internet connectivity,
mobile users can retrieve content, which other mobile users have already cached using the
web-based user interface of the 7DS system. However, it does not address the resource
limitation problem and network degradation problem that occur between a mobile device
and an AP.
S. Pack et al. [37] describe cache data access algorithms introducing a proxy cache
system. In this system, a wireless router is installed on transit vehicles that combine a
cellular data interface with local IEEE 802.11 connectivity. The wireless router has a proxy
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cache to enhance data access. They propose new algorithms of cache replacement and
cache consistency in order to improve cache hit ratio and reduce latency in obtaining data.
However, this work does not handle intermittently connected networks, so it suffers from
the lack of a system that optimizes the usage of limited resources between the proxy cache
and Internet AP in intermittently connected networks.
Proxy-based systems. A. Balasubramanian et al. [38] propose Thedu to enhance
interactive web search in intermittent mobile-to-Internet AP connectivity environments.
They use a server-side proxy (Internet proxy) that prefetches related web pages for web
searching requests to reduce the web search delay in intermittently connected networks.
However, this system has two problems because the server-side proxy that they use is on
the Internet side. It cannot resolve the problem of network throughput degradation, and
users cannot use the server-side proxy when there is no Internet connectivity.
J. Ott et al. [39] present a HTTP-over-DTN mechanism using bundles. Getting one web
page requires multiple requests and responses because a web page contains many objects,
so HTTP does not properly work in intermittently connected networks. To mitigate this
problem, this system uses bundles where multiple responses containing all the objects of a
web page are sent in a bundle for a single request. Even though this bundling provides an
enhanced performance in terms of the delay for getting the amount of web pages given a
limited connection time, it does not resolve the network throughput degradation problem
because this system uses a server-side proxy. Hence, it also has the same problem as Thedu
for our applications.
Routing and scheduling. Since there is a constraint on bandwidth in intermittently
connected networks, data scheduling algorithms have been proposed to select which data
will be delivered first when mobile devices encounter other peers. These algorithms are
based on mobility patterns of peer nodes [40][41], social structures (such as popularity and
community) [42][43], and/or personal relationships [44]. However, these algorithms focus on
how to forward or replicate data to decrease the delivery delay and increase the success rate
to deliver them to specific destinations. Hence, they do not address how to fetch content
efficiently from the Internet in intermittently connected networks.
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3.5 System design overview
In this section, we present an overview of the ICOW system. The main objective of ICOW is
to increase content availability, system usability and satisfaction of passengers by deploying
ICOW nodes on public transit vehicles. This ICOW system is used to access web applica-
tions and content. Fig. 3.4 presents the ICOW system. Passengers access web applications
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Figure 3.4: ICOW system. A vehicle has an ICOW node. Dotted lines present wireless
network connection and a solid line presents a wired network connection.
3.5.1 Caching proxy-based mechanism
ICOW nodes provide a caching mechanism to reduce the bandwidth usage by eliminating
retrieval of duplicate web content from the Internet during a network connection period.
Indeed, as discussed in Section 3.3.1, this intermittently connected network in public transit
systems suffers from limited bandwidth. However, by using this caching mechanism, the
ICOW system alleviates the limited bandwidth problem.
In addition, the ICOW node works as a web proxy server. It establishes the Internet
connection between passengers and an AP. Section 3.3.2 discussed that network throughput
decreases as the number of competing nodes increases. When there are a large number of
passengers who want to access the Internet, the network throughput degrades. However, us-
ing a proxy mechanism, the ICOW system can resolve the throughput degradation problem
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by reducing the number of competing nodes to one.
3.5.2 Channel division
As shown in Fig. 3.4, there are two wireless links: the link between passengers and an
ICOW node, and the link between an ICOW node and an AP. In wireless networks, when
one pair of a sender and a receiver occupies a wireless medium, others have to wait until
the link is idle. Hence, if the two wireless links of the ICOW system have the same channel,
two simultaneous transmissions in the two links cannot be allowed. This single channel
mechanism degrades the overall throughput of the two links.
To overcome this single channel problem, ICOW uses a channel division mechanism as
described in Fig. 3.5. ICOW nodes have two network interface cards, operating on different
channels. One of them is used to communicate with passengers and the other communicates
with an AP. Hence, there is no single channel interference between the two wireless links,













Figure 3.5: Channel division.
3.5.3 Queuing Requests
Existing HTTP proxy servers do not properly work in intermittently connected networks.
When there is no Internet connection, a proxy server simply returns a failure, indicating that
it has a network connection problem. Hence, the clients should keep retrying until there is
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an Internet connection. This paradigm causes inconvenience in the sense that clients have
to manually polling for the Internet connection every moment before sending requests as
shown in Fig. 3.6(a). If clients are doing other jobs while waiting for an Internet connection,
they have to occasionally stop them to check the Internet connectivity and transmit their
requests when the Internet connection is alive.
To overcome this inefficiency of the manual system, we propose a queuing system which
queues clients’ requests until the system fetches the requested content from the Internet.
This system allows passengers to send requests even when the ICOW node has no Internet
connection. The ICOW node queues the requests and retrieves requested content when it








































Figure 3.6: The shift of requesting point in time domain from the perspective of passengers.
The triangle represents the actual trying point to transmit a request. The arrow is the actual
data transmission. TD is a network disconnection period and TC is a network connection
period.
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In addition, the ICOW system aggregates requests. Existing HTTP proxy servers make
connections to a web server for each request. Hence, when multiple passengers request the
same content, each connection for each request wastes bandwidth. Especially with limited
bandwidth, this duplication of fetching the same content from the Internet significantly
degrades performance of the system.
To reduce this waste of bandwidth, the ICOW system has a request aggregation function-
ality. When an ICOW node receives multiple requests for the same URL during network
disconnection period, it aggregates the requests. Thanks to a caching mechanism of an
ICOW node, it can retrieve the content from the Internet only once and store the content
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Figure 3.7: Request aggregation. i is a passenger i. Solid arrow is for content A and dotted
arrow is for content B. TD is a network disconnection period and TC is a network connection
period.
3.5.4 Related content retrieval and asynchronous notification
One of advanced caching mechanisms of the ICOW system is to provide related content
to passengers when their requested content is not available (i.e., has not yet cached). For
example, when a passenger requests the New York Times web page but it is not cached,
the passenger might be interested in other news web sites which have already been cached,
say, the CNN web site.
However, passengers might still worry that they may miss their requested content, so
they might frequently check whether their content has been cached. To make the system
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easier to use, the ICOW node notifies passengers when their content has been cached without
having to manually check for updates. This asynchronous notification is based on a server-
























Figure 3.8: Related content retrieval and asynchronous notification
Fig. 3.8 shows how other cached content is provided to passengers and how passengers
receive their requested content. A passenger requests content A, but the content has not
been cached yet and there is no Internet connection. The ICOW node provides a web page
with a list of related cached content. Because the passenger is interested in content B in the
list and requests it, the ICOW node provides the cached content. By using asynchronous
notification of cached content, when the requested content A is cached (after the ICOW
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node has connected to the Internet), it pushes the notification to the passenger, indicating
that it cached the content. If the passenger is still interested in the content, the passenger
simply browses the content.
3.5.5 Scheduling algorithm
3.5.5.1 Popularity-based scheduling
When network connecting time is not long enough to handle all the requests, some passen-
gers might experience a long delay in getting requested content or not receive the content
before they get off. Hence, we need a scheduling mechanism to decrease content delivery
delay. We use popularity-based scheduling in which the request with highest frequency
has the highest priority. Because there might be several requests for the same content,
popularity-based scheduling efficiently reduces bandwidth usage and thereby reduces aver-
age content delivery delay. To break a tie, we apply normalized most-recent-first (MRF)
algorithm in which the most recently requested content has the highest priority.
Combining the popularity and MRF algorithms, we can calculate the value of content
that is used to determine the priority. The highest value the content has, the highest priority
the content has. The value, Vi(t), of content i at time t is





where Ni(t) is the number of requests for content i at time t and Tij is the requesting time
of content i of passenger j (Tij < t). Time t can be the sequence number of stops from
a vehicle depot or the monotonically increasing time whose reference point is the starting
time at a depot.
3.5.5.2 Prefetching related content
Generally, web pages have hyperlinks that point to other web pages, and there is a high
likelihood that passengers want to visit those linked pages from their current web pages.
For example, after reading headlines of news web pages, passengers may read the articles
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in more detail, clicking the links of the articles. In public transit systems, however, when
passengers want to read other articles after reading the current web page, the vehicle might
already leave the stop. Thus, they have to wait until the next network connection period.
If the traveling time of a vehicle to the next stop is long, the waiting time to obtain the
article becomes high.
To reduce this waiting time, we use a prefetching mechanism. When the system obtains
a web page, if there are no more requests from passengers in a queue, it prefetches pages
pointed to by hyperlinks (HTML <a> elements) on the received web page. Compared to
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Figure 3.9: Priority queuing for requests and prefetching.
Even though prefetching has a low priority, the system needs to reduce the number of
prefetching web pages because the number of hyperlinks is significant in most web pages,
especially front pages. Hence, we reduce the number of prefetching pages by applying rules:
(1) to eliminate advertisements, prefetched pages should be in the same domain as the
requested pages and (2) to save bandwidth, prefetched pages should not be media elements
(video or audio files).
3.5.6 Passenger privacy
Since all requests and responses pass through the ICOW node, there might be a privacy
issue. Indeed, passengers do not want their sensitive information to be cached and be
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released to others. Hence, ICOW needs a mechanism to protect privacy.
To control caching, ICOW uses an explicit cache control mechanism that is provided by
HTTP/1.1. HTTP/1.1 introduces the Cache-Control header to protect privacy [45]. There
are two types of Cache-Control directives for privacy, namely private response directive
and no-store request and response directive. The private response directive prevents a
shared cache, such as a cache in a proxy, from storing responses. However, a user specific,
personal cache such as caches in a browser, can cache responses. The no-store request and
response directive prevents requests and responses from being cached in any caches along a
data path. This is useful to prevent any sensitive content from being released to the public.
By checking the Cache-Control header, ICOW decides whether it caches content or not,
so that it protects passengers’ privacy.













Figure 3.10: System architecutre
The system architecture follows from the description above. An ICOW node consists
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Figure 3.11: Flow chart in an ICOW node.
of four software components: network monitor, proxy server, cache and local web server.
Fig. 3.10 shows the system architecture of an ICOW node. Fig. 3.11 shows a flow chart that
illustrates the implementation of the mechanisms described so far. We describe the major
components in more detail below.
3.6.1 Network monitor
The main role of network monitor is to determine whether the ICOW node can connect to
an AP. The network monitor periodically checks whether network connectivity is available
and notifies the proxy server component. If connectivity is available, the ICOW node tries
to fetch content through the AP.
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We have implemented the network monitor modules for two platforms, Windows and
Linux, because these modules require kernel specific API to check for link connectivity.
Windows version of the network monitor module internally calls a driver level function call,
DeviceIoControl, through the NDIS (Network Driver Interface Specification) and obtains
the information of network interface card (NIC). On the other hand, for Linux, we use
kernel level system call, iwgetid, to check the status of NIC and the IP address that is
bound to the MAC address of the NIC.
3.6.2 HTTP proxy server
The HTTP proxy server handles all incoming and outgoing packets. We use the Muffin [46],
an open source web proxy software. We add four features to Muffin: redirecting to local
web server, HTTP request scheduling, request queuing, and web caching. When the proxy
server receives HTTP requests from passengers, it redirects the requests to the local web
server if the local cache has the content. Otherwise, the requests are queued to be handled
during network connection periods. Based on the popularity of requests, the priority of the
requests is determined, as described in Section 3.5.5.1. Proxy server component triggers web
caching that downloads requested content in the queue when it has a network connection.
ICOW supports automatic discovery and configuration of the proxy server using Proxy
Auto-Config (PAC) [47] and Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol (WPAD) [48]. PAC file 1
is used to configure a proxy server, and WPAD protocol 2 is used to find automatically the
location of the PAC file. Using a PAC file and WPAD protocol, passengers can automatically
discover and configure a proxy server.
1The PAC file has a JavaScript function, FindProxyForURL (url, host) where url is the requested
URL, and host is the hostname extracted from the URL. This function returns host and port number of a
proxy server. In our system, the return value is the IP address of the ICOW node and port number for the
proxy server.
2WPAD protocol is used to locate the corresponding URL of the PAC file (which is in the local web server
in our system) using DHCP and/or DNS discovery method. Passengers can fetch the PAC file through this
corresponding URL. Most web browsers, such as Internet Explore 8 and 9, FireFox 5.0, Chrome 12, and
Safari 5, support WPAD.
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3.6.3 Web cache
To eliminate the repetition of the same content retrieval from the Internet, caching is
used. It downloads the requested web pages, including HTML files, images, CSS files and
JavaScript files. In addition, it prefetches other content pointed to by hyperlinks in the
same domain of requested web pages. The list of cached content is accessible to a proxy
server and a local web server.
3.6.4 Local web server
The local web server provides the web-based user interface to passengers, informing the
availability of requested content and providing other cached content when the requested
content is not available during a network disconnection period.
The local web server is built on Apache Tomcat [49], an open source software of Java
Servlet and JavaServer, with Ajax Push [50], a server-initiated push mechanism. The push
mechanism is for asynchronous notification to inform updated information to passengers.
Visiting a guide page, passengers are able to see all the cached content. An HTML iframe 3,
along with delivered cached pages, is used to show the update in a passenger’s browser.
Fig. 3.12 shows the browsers of passengers. A passenger receives a guide page which
includes a list that the ICOW node has cached when there is no Internet connection and
the requested content (New York Times) has not yet been cached (Fig. 3.12(a)). While the
passenger is waiting to get requested content, the passenger can read cached pages (CNN
web page in Fig. 3.12). If the ICOW node caches the requested page (New York Times in
this figure), the passenger browses the notification in its iframe (Fig. 3.12(c)).
3.7 Performance evaluation
3.7.1 Throughput
We use the OPNET modeler network simulator [35] to evaluate the performance of the
proposed ICOW system compared with the direct access system (in which passegers access
3http://www.w3.org/TR/html5/. The HTML iframe represents a nested browsing context (inline frame)
that allows another HTML document to be embedded within the current HTML document.
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Figure 3.12: Screen shots of a guide page and cached pages with iframe for notification
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APs directly) in terms of throughput. Figs. 3.13(a) and (b) show the simulation topology
of direct access system and ICOW, respectively.
Assumptions that we use in this simulation are:
• each passenger retrieves different web sites to avoid the case that a single web server
handles all the requests,
• we increase passenger’s arrival rate (26/120, 30/120, 36/120 arrival/sec) according to
Poisson distribution,
• each passenger generates a single HTTP request to a corresponding web server at
randomly chosen [0-120] seconds of an entire simulation time where the first half is a
network disconnection period [0-60] secconds while the last half is a network connection
period [60-120] second,
• the generated HTTP requests during network disconnection period are queued and
transmitted as soon as the network connection is available, at the beginning of network
connection period (at 60 second of simulation time),
• using an image-based web browsing profile that generally has many images (i.e., a
front page of many web sites follows the image-based web browsing profile), we select
an HTTP request size of 100 KB and HTTP response size of 1 MB, including all inline
requests and responses for the inline links of the page,
• and the channel rate for wireless links is 11 Mb/s.
Fig. 3.14 depicts the average throughput of ICOW, compared to the direct access system
as a function of number of contending passenger nodes (N). The throughput measured by
simulation only involves IEEE 802.11 DATA frames other than control and management
frames. The simulation result shows that the average downlink (DL) throughput of the
ICOW system is higher than that of the direct access system regardless of N . ICOW’s
throughput gain against the direct access system comes from that the ICOW nodes perform
less backoff processes than the nodes in the direct access system. For N = 35, when the
wireless link is about to be saturated, the ICOW system is able to obtain about 5 Mb/s
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Figure 3.13: Simulation topology. Dotted line is wireless network connection and solid line
is wired connection.
throughput which is about 20 % better than the throughput (4 Mb/s) of the direct access
system. On the other hand, the average uplink (UL) throughput for both systems is almost
the same because the relatively small size of HTTP requests (100 KB) affects the link
throughput less.
Fig. 3.15 plots the downlink throughput of HTTP responses from an AP to passengers
as well as the number of web pages that have been downloaded and cached for N=26, 30
and 36, respectively. The result shows that ICOW has a higher number of downloaded web
pages than the direct access system within a given time. As shown in Fig. 3.15(a), when
N=26, both ICOW and direct access system can download all HTTP responses before the
network connection period ends. In Fig. 3.15(b), when N=30, all requested web pages
are completely downloaded for 60 seconds in ICOW system while only 25 web pages are
downloaded in a direct access system. When N=36, however, neither system can receive
all web pages during the network connection period.
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Figure 3.14: Average throughput. N is the number of passengers. DL is downlink and UL
is uplink. Channel rate between a bus and an AP is 11 Mb/s.
Another interesting result of this simulation is that at 90 seconds, as the number of
passengers increases, the number of downloaded pages decreases. There are two reasons:
the first reason is that the higher number of HTTP requests consumes more bandwidth so
the HTTP responses are delayed. The other reason is that the limited bandwidth is shared
by passengers to receive responses. ICOW can schedule the order of retrieval (e.g., serializing
page download or limiting the number of simultaneous downloading pages). However, the
direct access system has to share the bandwidth because there is no scheduling functionality
in the system, so it suffers from longer delay to download a content as the number of requests
are higher. Hence, there is larger number of incomplete web pages within a given period.
CHAPTER 3. INTERNET CACHE ON WHEELS (ICOW): INTERNET ACCESS IN


































































































































































(c) N = 36
Figure 3.15: Downlink throughput. Channel rate is 11 Mb/s. N is the number of passen-
gers. The network disconnection period is from 0 second to 60 second. We keep network
connection after 60 seconds in order to see when downloading all the requested web pages
is finished.
CHAPTER 3. INTERNET CACHE ON WHEELS (ICOW): INTERNET ACCESS IN
PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEMS 68
3.7.2 Cache hit ratio
The cache hit ratio Q(Nc, T ) is the probability that a requested content after the T -th stop
is in a cache when there are total Nc kinds of web pages.




Pr(RK = k)Pr(1Rk(T ) = 1),
where 1R(T ) is the indicator function that shows whether the requested content has been
cached after the T -th stop or not. We assume that the random variable RK is a Zipf
random variable, and an independent and identically distributed random variable. Hence,




where k is their popularity rank and s is the exponent characterizing Zipf distribution.
Pr(1Rk(T ) = 1) is the probability that content whose rank is k has been cached by the
T -th stop. Nr is the number of new requests at a stop, and we assume that it is a Poisson
random variable.












where 1Rk(T ) is the indicator function that shows whether the content whose rank is k has
cached by the T -th stop and 1rk(t) is the indicator function that shows whether the web
page whose rank is k is cached during the t-th stop.
Fig. 3.16 shows the cache hit ratio of web pages requested by passengers as a vehicle
makes stops. The cache hit ratio increases as a vehicle makes more stops because the
cached web pages have been accumulated. This means that passengers are able to receive
requested web pages from the local cache in an ICOW node, not from the Internet, with
higher probability as a vehicle makes more stops. Hence, the bandwidth usage of the ICOW
node during network connection periods decreases.
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Figure 3.16: Cache hit ratio. The passenger arrival rate λ is 10 per stop, and the exponent
characterizing Zipf distribution s is one. Nc is the number of web pages.
3.7.3 Request aggregation
In this Section, we evaluate a request aggregation mechanism. Expected number of requests
in a queue E[NR] is the number of requests at the T -th stop with Nc web pages when we










Pr(Nr = n)PQ(Rk, T,Nr)
where PQ(Rk, T ) is the probability that a web page whose rank is k is in a queue at the T -th
stop. We assume that the frequency of a web page whose rank is k is a Zipf random variable
and independent and identically distributed random variable. The number of all requests
from passengers Nr is a Poisson random variable and PQ(Rk, T,Nr) is the probability that
a web page whose rank is k is in a queue when there are Nr requests at the T -th stop.
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PQ(Rk, T,Nr) = Pr(1Qk(Nr, T ) = 1)Pr(1Rk(T ) = 0)
where 1Qk(Nr, T ) is the indicator function that shows whether the web page type k is
requested at stop T when there are total Nr requests and 1Rk(T ) is the indicator function
that shows whether the web page whose rank is k has cached by the T -th stop.
Pr(1Qk(Nr, T ) = 1) = 1− Pr(1Qk(Nr, T ) = 0)
= 1− (1− Pr(Rk = k))Nr















where 1rk(t) is the indicator function that shows whether the web page whose rank is k is
cached during the t-th stop.
Fig. 3.17 shows the expected number of web pages that are downloaded from the Internet
at each stop. We evaluate three mechanisms: direct access, ICOW with cache (ICOWCO),
and ICOW with request aggregation (ICOWRA). In ICOWCO, the downloaded web pages
are cached, but request aggregation is not used. In ICOWRA, the downloaded web pages are
cached, and request aggregation mechanism is used. We get the expected number of pages
of ICOWCO mechanism from the formula in Section 3.7.2. Both ICOWCO and ICOWRA
reduce the number of pages, compared to the direct access mechanism. Because it eliminates
duplicated requests and responses in the request aggregation mechanism, ICOWRA has the
smallest number of downloaded web pages. This means that the ICOWRA mechanism uses
less bandwidth to handle the same requests from passengers.
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Figure 3.17: Expected number of downloaded web pages at each stop. The passenger arrival
rate λ is 10 per stop. Nc is the number web pages, and the exponent characterizing Zipf
distribution s is one. ICOWCO means that only caching is used, so request aggregation
mechanism is not applied. ICOWRA means that request aggregation is applied.
3.7.4 Scheduling algorithm
To evaluate scheduling algorithms, we applied two metrics: average content delivery delay
and average aggregated utility. Utility function represents the value of users’ satisfaction
in completing jobs over time. C. B. Lee et al. [51] discussed that “This utility function
is widely used in economics, and has recently been used in high-performance computing
(HPC) and grid scheduling.” In our system, the job is considered complete when passengers
receive their requested content.
C. B. Lee et. al [51] conducted a survey to examine types of utility functions for real
jobs on a real HPC system. They obtained three types of utility functions from the survey:
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Ui(t) : The utility of content i at time t
Uij (t) :  The utility of content i of passenger j at time t







Figure 3.18: Utility function u(t). ν is a max utility value and Toff is the time that a
passenger gets off.
step function, linear decay function, and exponential decay function. Fig. 3.18 shows the
three utility functions. We applied these three types of utility functions to our evaluation.






where Uij(t) is the utility of content i of passenger j at time t and Ni(t) is the number of
requests for content i at time t.
We use the Monte Carlo method in order to evaluate performance due to the complexity
of analysis. Shown in Table 3.1, the parameters that we use in our analysis are passenger
arrival rate, passenger travel time, the successful rate of handling requests, the number of
web pages, popularity of web pages, and the utility function of web pages. We assume that
each passenger requests one web page (including HTML fiels, images, CSS files, JavaScript
files) while boarding the bus or train. We use a discrete time value, so the time value n
means the n th stop from a vehicle departs from its depot. If passengers request web pages
at the same stop, the generation times of those requests are the same.
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We evaluate five scheduling algorithms: FCFS, FCFS with popularity for tie-breaker
(FCFS+popularity), popularity with FCFS for tie-breaker (Populairty+FCFS), popularity
with most-recent-first (MRF) for tie-breaker (Populairty+MRF), and maximizing utility
with MRF for tie-breaker (Max utility+MRF).
According to Table 3.2, Max utility+MRF has the best performance, as we expected.
This scheduling algorithm is ideal because it reflects utility functions of all the requests to
maximize satisfaction of passengers. However, it is based on the strong assumption that
this algorithm knows the utility value of each request. In real implementation, however, it
is almost impossible to satisfy this assumption.
Our goal is to propose an algorithm that has as close performance as Max utility+MRF
while the proposed algorithm supports easy implementation. Table 3.2 shows that our
proposed scheduling algorithm, Popularity+MRF, has close performance results of Max
utility+MRF in terms of average aggregate utility and delay. Because of MRF function
of Popularity+MRF, it has similar average aggregate utility value as Max utility+MRF.
The utility has the highest value at the beginning of the requesting time and decays as
the time flows. Because of MRF function, those two algorithms have a shorter delivery
delay than others. However, popularity-based algorithm can be easily implemented by
checking the number of requests at an ICOW node. Thus, considering the complexity of the
implementation, Popularity+MRF might be suitable in terms of easiness of implementation
and performance.
3.8 Future work
3.8.1 Hybrid network connection
Currently, we assume that the ICOW system only uses WLAN at access points to provide a
low cost method for Internet access. However, if mobile devices have two network interfaces
(802.11 WLAN and a 3G/4G cellular network), a hybrid network system that combines
these two networks might provide more efficient Internet access. For example, a cellular
network can be used when there is no Internet connection.
Generally, users want to limit the usage of high cost network services (cellular network
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service) while increasing the usage of free network services (public 802.11 WLAN service).
For example, when there are system updates for a mobile device, those updates might not be
time-sensitive. Thus, the user wants to download the updates using public 802.11 WLAN
because it is free and faster. However, in some cases, users are willing to use high cost
networking services. For example, the data size of email is not high (we assume that the
email does not have a large file attachment) but the email might be time-sensitive. Hence,
the user is willing to use cellular networks even though the user will consume his or her
limited quota for the usage of cellular network. In addition, some applications require a
certain quality of network services. For example, a media streaming application requires a
certain amount of bandwidth, so a user needs to select a network interface that satisfies the
minimum bandwidth requirement.
Because of these different preferences and application requirements, ICOW should be
extended to automatically select the best network interface according to user preferences
and policies.
3.8.2 Prefetching
The ICOW system prefetches the hyperlinks in web pages. However, the number of hy-
perlinks on todays web pages is very high. For example, we counted 461 and 471 observed
number of hyperlinks in a front page of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal,
respectively. Hence, we need to reduce the number of hyperlinks that the ICOW system
prefetches.
However, since the format of web pages is dynamic, it is very hard to find common rules
to reduce the number of web pages to prefetch. Hence, there should be an algorithm to
select the hyperlinks to prefetch. The algorithm based on a relationship, such as similarity,
between the current web page and prefetching pages might be one possible solution. A
selection algorithm based on users interests, exchanged in the form of meta-data, might be
another possible way to select prefetching content.
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3.9 Conclusion
We propose ICOW to maximize content availability and system usability in intermittently
connected networks for public transit systems. This system is a cache- and proxy-based
system to enhance link throughput and resolve network resource limitations. Not only does
this allow for maximizing network resource utility and minimizing bandwidth usage, but it
also provides a system that is easy to use for passengers.
Our evaluation shows that ICOW increases link throughput compared to a direct access
system. Our caching-based mechanism allows more passengers to get more content with
limited network resources, and decreases the delay of getting content. By using popularity-
based scheduling mechanism, ICOW provides higher satisfaction of obtaining content for
passengers and decreases content delivery delay.
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Chapter 4




When mobile devices are temporally disconnected to the Internet, they can share informa-
tion with peers using ad-hoc networking. These wireless mobile ad-hoc networks do not
have any central servers, such as a DNS server and a DHCP server, though we assume that
they run on IP. For these reasons, mobile ad-hoc networks require Zero Configuration Net-
working (Zeroconf) [52]. Zeroconf provides for the assignment of IP addresses, host naming,
and service discovery without any central servers or human adminstration. There are sev-
eral applications that are designed for wireless mobile ad-hoc network and intermittently
connected networks. Service discovery is a vital part of those applications, as it allows those
applications to automatically discover services as well as announce their services. Therefore,
Zeroconf plays an important role in order for such applications to work properly.
However, Zeroconf suffers from problems in highly mobile ad-hoc networks. In these
networks, the frequency of devices joining and leaving a local ad-hoc network can be very
high. Network membership changes are not announced to other devices, and there is no
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algorithm in Zeroconf to detect these frequent network membership changes. When a device
joins a new network, the network resources of the node, such as IP address and host name in
the area, may possibly conflict with the attributes of the existing members of that network.
Another potential problem is that services should be announced or browsed for fre-
quently to be discovered in a highly mobile network, but this causes energy consumption
and high network overhead. Bonjour [53], the most popular implementation of Zeroconf,
uses an exponential back-off scheme to reduce energy consumption and overhead, but it
causes the slow detection of new services.
We analyze the relationship between the interval of service browsing, average residence
time of devices in a local ad-hoc network, and the probability that new services announced
by new joining peers are not discovered. We then propose a new algorithm [12] that allows
devices to discover network membership changes and new services while minimizing energy
consumption and network overhead. In our algorithm, each device can detect whether it has
joined a new network area. Monitoring changes to the network interface allows a device to
detect the network membership changes. If a node detects that it has joined a new network,
it resolves possibly conflicting of IP address and host names, and announces or browses for
services.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.1.1, we introduce
Zeroconf. Section 4.2 discusses potential problems of Zeroconf in mobile ad-hoc networks.
We describe related work in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 describes our new service discov-
ery algorithm. Finally, Section 4.5 describes implementation and performance of our new
algorithm.
4.1.1 Overview of Zero Configuration Networking (Zeroconf)
The IETF Zero Configuration Networking (Zeroconf) Working Group [52] has proposed
four main requirements [54] for Zeroconf: IP interface configuration, translation between
host name and IP address, IP multicast address allocation, and service discovery. The
Zeroconf specification completely describes IP interface configuration, but omits specifying
protocols for the other requirements. Bonjour [53] is one of most popular implementations
of Zeroconf, and it satisfies the requirements of Zeroconf.
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4.1.1.1 IP interface configuration
The configuration of IP address and netmask without a central server is key to ad-hoc
networking operations. Zeroconf specifies the use of the IPv4 link-local address [55], which
includes address selection and address conflict resolution. After a host randomly selects
an IP address within the 169.254/16 subnet, it announces this address by broadcasting
ARP announcements in the local area to detect possible IP address conflicts. If the host
receives an ARP response from another host which already uses this IP address, it will select
another random IP address. Windows and Mac OS implement the auto-configuration of
IPv4 link-local addressing. Linux requires installation of a daemon that implements link-
local addresses.
4.1.1.2 Translation between host name and IP address
Since a host name is much more user-friendly than an IP address, Zeroconf also requires
auto-configuration of a host name without a central server. The Zeroconf host name protocol
allows host names to be mapped into IP addresses and vice versa. In addition, it resolves
naming conflicts.
There are two protocols for host naming on a local network without a central DNS server:
Multicast DNS (mDNS) [56] and Link-local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) [57]. In
January 2007, Link-local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) [57] was approved as an
informational RFC by the IETF to address the name resolution requirement. However,
LLMNR is rarely used; instead mDNS is widely used on Windows, Linux and Mac OS,
and has been successfully ported to other POSIX platforms and Java-based platforms as
well. Bonjour uses mDNS for host naming in a local area network. Multicast DNS allows
translation between names and IP addresses and provides DNS-like operation without a
central DNS server.
In mDNS, each device first selects their own local host name. The form of the name
is “host.local.”, and the “.local.” suffix means that it is link-local and meaningful only on
local network. The naming conflict resolution is similar to IPv4 link-local address conflict
resolution. A host announces the name in local area by multicasting to detect possible name
conflicts. If there is a naming conflict, the host re-selects its own host name.
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4.1.1.3 IP multicast address allocation
IP multicast address allocation allows an application to select appropriate multicast address.
The range of IP multicast address is from 224.0.0.0 to 239.255.255.255. Bonjour uses the
mDNS multicast address, 224.0.0.251 [56].
4.1.1.4 Service discovery
Zeroconf allows users to discover services and choose among services without knowing the
location of the service provider in advance. Bonjour has proposed DNS-Based Service
Discovery (DNS-SD) [58] for service discovery for Zeroconf. This service discovery protocol
allows users to find all service instances of a particular service type and to resolve IP address,
port number and additional information for the service using PTR, SRV and TXT records.
The PTR lookup of the format 〈Service〉.〈Domain〉 is used to obtain all service instances
which have the same 〈Service〉.〈Domain〉. The name of a service instance is of the format
〈Instance〉.〈Service〉.〈Domain〉. For example, the name can be segihong. daap. tcp.local.,
where daap. tcp is the iTunes music sharing service.
The SRV record provides the port number and IP address of the service provider, and
TXT records are used to store additional information about services as attribute-value pairs.
4.2 Zeroconf in mobile ad-hoc networks
4.2.1 Network membership changes
Since the membership of mobile ad-hoc networks changes frequently, network resources such
as IP addresses and local host names should be announced to detect possible conflicts in the
new network area [54]. However, Zeroconf does not include an algorithm to detect network
changes. Furthermore, Zeroconf does not specify an algorithm to resolve possible conflicts
between a new member and other members of the network.
4.2.2 Network traffic overhead
In highly mobile networks, devices frequently join and leave a network. In this scenario,
if the services that mobile nodes provide are not frequently announced or looked up, the



















Figure 4.1: Mobile node joins and leaves a local network
services might not be discovered by other mobile nodes. Thus, services should be an-
nounced and looked up frequently. However, this causes energy consumption and high
network overhead. We analyze the relationship between the probability that new services
announcements are not discovered, average residence duration of devices in a local area
and the average interval of service announcing or browsing in this section. We assume that
the service announcing and browsing interval follows an exponential distribution with rate
α; the service announcing and browsing are multicasted; the node arrival rate to a local
ad-hoc area follows an exponential distribution with rate λ; the node residence time follows
an exponential distribution with rate µ; and the number of nodes in a current local ad-hoc
area is n. For simplicity, a new node A announces a service, and other nodes browse the
service. The service can be any types of services, such as file sharing service and message
delivery services.
Fig. 4.1 shows a mobile node joins and leaves an ad-hoc network with service discovery.
In Fig. 4.1, T is the interval between the last service browse request before a new node
A arrives and the next service browsing request. T is min{T1, T2, ....,Tn}, where Tk is
the interval between the next service browsing request time of node k and the last service
browsing time of node i, where i is the last service browse request before node A arrives
and k is the first service browse request after node A arrives. X is the residence time of
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Figure 4.2: The mean service loss probability of new services
CHAPTER 4. ACCELERATING SERVICE DISCOVERY IN AD-HOC ZERO
CONFIGURATION NETWORKING 85
node A. Y is the interval between node A’s next service announcement time and its arrival
time.
The service loss probability, Q(n), is the probability that node A cannot hear any
browsing requests and does not announce services during staying in the new network.








































Fig. 4.2 shows the result of the analysis. The figure plots the mean service loss probabil-
ity, θ, against the average number of users. The average number of users affects the mean
service loss probability. If there are many users in the local network area, the mean service
loss probability decreases. It is reasonable since the browsing requests are not synchronized
between devices, so a node has more chances of receiving browsing requests when there are
more users. We can observe from Fig. 4.2 that as the average residence time of a mobile
node decreases and the average service browsing interval increases, the service loss prob-
ability, Q(n), increases. We are interested in the proper average service browsing interval
in the case of a highly mobile environment, such as vehicular ad-hoc networks. As we can
see in Fig. 4.2(c), if average service browsing interval is one hour and the average number
of users is four, the mean service loss probability is above 0.5. Therefore, to reduce the
probability, service browsing should be made more frequent. If the average service browsing
interval is 10 minutes, the probability decreases to around 0.1. This, however, increases
energy consumption and network traffic.
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There are two phases in discovering services. One of them is the announcing of new
services, and the other is browsing for and resolving the services. If there are a lot of service
announcements, or if service browsing is done frequently, then services can be discovered
with higher probability. As we can see in the result of the analysis, the services should be
announced or browsed for frequently in order to be discovered in highly mobile networks.
However, this causes high overhead. DNS-based service discovery of Bonjour uses an ex-
ponential back-off scheme [56] to reduce overhead. The intervals between the subsequent
service queries are doubled; the starting interval is one second, and it increases exponentially
until it reaches the maximum interval of one hour, and it remains constant after that. This
exponential back-off scheme can reduce energy consumption and network overhead, but it
causes slow detection of services.
4.3 Related work
There are papers [59][60][61] about service discovery protocols in mobile ad-hoc networks,
but they are concerned about scalability, building service discovery support in the network
layer, and routing problems. They do not discuss how to decrease energy consumption and
network overhead while decreasing service discovery delay.
L. Raju et al. [62] use beacon frames to get information about neighbor nodes. This
acquired information is used to know the topology formation. However, this mechanism
is used to decide forwarding nodes, so it is not related to service discovery mechanisms.
Furthermore, it does not properly implement reading beacon frames at the application
layer. Actually, reading every beacon frame at the application layer requires a lot of CPU
overhead, so this overhead is not suitable for mobile devices.
4.4 Accelerating service discovery in Zeroconf
4.4.1 Mobile device joining IEEE 802.11 ad-hoc networks
The IEEE 802.11 standard [63] specifies when to generate beacon frames in ad-hoc mode.
In ad-hoc mode, all nodes participate in generating beacon frames. Each node maintains
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Figure 4.3: Mobile node joins the network
aBeaconPeriod which specifies the length of a beacon interval, and its value is typically
100 ms. aBeaconPeriod is same for all nodes in the same Basic Service Set (BSS) 1. The
beacon period is included in beacon frames and probe response frames. When nodes join
the local ad-hoc network, they adopt the beacon period. All nodes maintain their own time
synchronization function (TSF) timer for aBeaconPeriod. The value of the TSF timer is an
integer with modulus 264. When a network interface starts, the value of the TSF timer is set
1The IEEE 802.11 standard [63] defines that “The BSS is a set of stations controlled by a single coordi-
nation function (CF).”
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to zero and incremented every microsecond. In ad-hoc mode, each node also has a random
backoff timer. It chooses a random delay uniformly distributed in the range between zero
and twice aCWmin × aSlotTime 2. If a node receives another beacon frame before the timer
expires, it cancels the remaining random delay as well as the pending beacon transmission.
If no beacon arrives during the random delay, a node sends a beacon frame. Thus, there is
only one beacon frame in each aBeaconPeriod in the same BSS.
To join a network, each node scans all the channels. There are two ways of scanning
channels: passive scanning and active scanning. In passive scanning, a node listens to
all channels by hopping across channels. A node listens to beacon frames which contain
a desired Service Set Identification (SSID). In active scanning, a node generates probe
request frames which contain the desired SSID. The node that generated the last beacon
frame generates the probe response frame for the response of the probe request frame if
the value of SSID in the probe request is a broadcast address or matches the address of its
own interface. Beacon frames and probe response frames contain the TSF timer value in
the timestamp field and BSSID. When a node receives a beacon frame or a probe response
frame, it adopts the information, such as the BSSID and the TSF timer, only if the SSID
in the frame matches and the value of the timestamp is later than the node’s TSF timer.
Therefore, the BSSID and the TSF timer (of the node which receives the beacon frame)
become the same value as that of the node which sends the beacon frame.
Fig. 4.3 shows a new device joining a local ad-hoc network. In Fig. 4.3(a), a mobile
node A in area BSS1 moves to area BSS2, and it receives a beacon frame from a node B.
The beacon frame contains the BSSID and the TSF timer value of BSS2. Before node A
joins BSS2, node A’s BSSID is 02:02:2D:0D:6B:0E and the TSF timer value is 1000. The
BSSID value of all nodes in BSS2 is 00:35:0E:3A:5D:5E and the TSF timer value is 2000.
Fig. 4.3(b) shows node A joining BSS2. After joining BSS2 networks, node A’s BSSID
becomes 00:35:0E:3A:5D:5E. The TSF timer value of node A becomes 2000.
2The IEEE 802.11 standard [63] defines that “the parameter aCWmin defines the minimum size of the
contention window in slots.” aSlotTime can be calculated using the following equation [63]. aSlotTime =
aCCATime+aRxTxTurnaroundTime+aAirPropagationTime+aMACProcessingDelay.
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Figure 4.4: A cross-layer architecture for accelerating service discovery.
4.4.2 Accelerating service discovery in mobile ad-hoc networks
In order to accelerate service discovery, we detect changes of the network membership.
When a node detects that it has joined a new network, it starts announcing and browsing
services. This enables mobile devices to reduce the service discovery delay. In addition,
the algorithm can reduce energy consumption and network overhead because devices do
not need to announce or browse for services periodically and frequently. As we can see in
Fig. 4.3, when two ad-hoc networks are merged, one of the networks changes its BSSID
value. We can check this BSSID value to detect if the node has joined a new network.
After a node detects that it has joined a new network, it announces or browses services
to support real-time service discovery. If a node has services, it announces the services in the
network. If a node is interested in some services, it browses for the services. Furthermore,
network resources, such as IP addresses and local names, are announced in order to avoid
possible conflicts among the members of the network. In our algorithm, a mobile node
announces or browses services in two cases: when it starts Zeroconf and when it detects that
it has joined a new network. Therefore, our new algorithm minimizes energy consumption,
network overhead and service discovery delay.
Fig. 4.4 presents the architecture of our service discovery system. We design a cross-
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layer architecture in the sense that we use the information provided by the data link layer
for our service discovery applications. Beacon frames in the data link layer can be used
to detect new devices, and monitoring the BSSID value at the application layer allows
mobile devices to detect network membership changes and notify the changes to the service
discovery system for announcing or browsing services and resolving any possible conflict of
IP addresses and host names in the new network.
4.5 Implementation and performance
We can read the BSSID value of a wireless network interface using the standard wireless
extensions for Linux and the Wireless LAN API for Windows. In Linux, we use the ioctl()
function with the SIOCGIWAP option which enables us to get the interface’s BSSID value.
In Windows, we can use the WlanGetNetworkBssList() function.
We used three Linux laptop computers to test our service discovery system. Our test
modeled a situation where a laptop computer A joins a local ad-hoc network which already
contains two laptop computers B and C. Computer A announces a service and the other two
computers browse for the service. The result of our testing shows that whenever computer
A joins the local ad-hoc network, the other two computers can properly discover the service
that computer A offers.
We also measured the service discovery delay. The delay represents the period between
the moment when a node joins a network and the moment when that new node’s service is
discovered. We compared the result with an analysis of the delay of Zeroconf with periodic
service announcing and browsing. In Zeroconf, we assume that all service announcing and
browsing intervals follow an exponential distribution with rate α. D is the delay. tA, tB,
and tC is the next announcing or browsing time of computer A, B and C.
Pr(D > t) = Pr(min(tA, tB, tC) > t)
= Pr(tA > t)Pr(tB > t)Pr(tC > t)
= e−3αt.
Fig. 4.5 shows that the delay versus the average service announcing and browsing in-
terval. As we can see in Fig. 4.5, the delay of Zeroconf is increased as the mean service
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Figure 4.5: Delay measurement of the service discovery protocol
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announcing and browsing interval is increased. However, the delay of our algorithm is not
affected by the average service interval. It means that services do not need to be periodically
and frequently announced or browsed in our system. Furthermore, the delay in our system
is negligible. It is because we use an algorithm that can detect network topology changes.
4.6 Conclusion
Zeroconf plays an important role in ad-hoc networks, providing the assignment of IP ad-
dresses, host naming, and service discovery without any central servers. However, it has
some potential problems in mobile ad-hoc networks. Zeroconf does not support detecting
network membership changes. Because of the frequent changes of the membership, services
need to be announced or browsed frequently to be properly discovered. However, it causes
energy consumption and network traffic overhead. We have proposed a new algorithm to
accelerate service discovery, especially in a highly mobile and low density network envi-
ronment. It allows mobile users to detect network membership changes and new services
while minimizing energy consumption and network overhead. Since in the service discovery
systems, services are announced and browsed only if the system is initially started or there
are network membership changes, it can reduce energy consumption and network overhead.
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Chapter 5
Measurement of multicast service
discovery in a campus wireless
network
5.1 Introduction
Large-scale wireless networks have become increasingly common as WiFi-enabled mobile
devices gain popularity. Service discovery protocols are needed so that users of wireless
devices can find peer services. DNS-based service discovery (DNS-SD) [58] that leverages
multicast DNS (mDNS) [56] is among the most widely deployed service discovery proto-
cols. One of the most popular applications that use mDNS is iTunes [14], a multimedia
application, which allows users to browse playlists of other iTunes users in the same subnet.
There is a surge in the popularity of applications that use mDNS. Unfortunately, mDNS
generates significant traffic overhead. Such overhead may especially be seen on college
campuses, where wireless networks are pervasive and a large number of wireless users are
able to work on the same subnet. For example, because of the performance impact of
mDNS traffic, the Office of Information Technology at Princeton University filters mDNS
packets [64].
We are not aware of any previous measurement and analysis of the overhead of multicast
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service discovery traffic in a campus wireless network. Therefore, we measured and analyzed
the performance impact of mDNS traffic in a typical college wireless network to show how
much traffic overhead mDNS generates. We show the bandwidth usage of mDNS packets and
the effect of multiple APs on multicast packets in Columbia University’s wireless network.
We define three service discovery models, which correspond most closely to the DNS-
SD/mDNS traffic behavior. We analyze these different service discovery models in terms of
traffic overhead and service discovery delay for different network sizes and lifetimes. This
measurement and analysis [13] provides insights in choosing proper service discovery models
that have different trade-offs between the overhead and the delay.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We describe related work in
Section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes how our measurement was set up. Section 5.4 outlines
our findings about mDNS traffic in a campus environment, in terms of the number of
packets and their impact on wireless traffic. Fianlly, in Section 5.5, we analyze different
service discovery models.
5.2 Related work
There are papers that present the measurement and analysis of network packets in large
area wireless networks [65][66][67]. However, their main considerations are network traffic
patterns and user behavior in networks. They do not analyze mDNS and multicast packets.
Handerson et al. [68] present the characteristic of wireless network traffic by applications,
including iTunes, but this paper does not show the details of iTunes, which uses the mDNS
protocol.
Our previous work [12] presents the delay and service loss probability of service discovery
in ad-hoc Zero Configuration Networking (Zeroconf), but it does not show the measurement
and analysis of service discovery packet overhead.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no published papers which perform the mea-
surement and analysis of mDNS packet overhead in a campus wireless network.
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Figure 5.1: The average mDNS packet rate on a weekday
5.3 Measurement setup
We measured mDNS overhead in Columbia University’s wireless network (IEEE 802.11 b/g)
organized as a single subnet during spring semester 2006. Since mDNS works within a
subnet, all mDNS packets are transmitted to all wireless users who use mDNS in the campus.
We use two sniffing tools, mDNSNetMonitor and Wireshark 0.99.6 [69], to measure mDNS
traffic in this network. Apple provides mDNSNetMonitor along with the Bonjour source
code to record the patterns of mDNS protocol usage. We use Wireshark to analyze the raw
mDNS packets and other multicast packets to obtain more details.
Each measurement lasted for two minutes. We selected a measurement time from 2 PM
to 5 PM, which is the busiest time of user activity on campus, as shown in Fig. 5.1. The
machine we used for sniffing has 1 GB of RAM and a 1.66 GHz Core 2 CPU running Linux.
The PCMCIA wireless card used for sniffing is a Orinoco 11a/b/g card with the Atheros
chipset. We used the network card interface in monitoring mode to capture all packets
over-the-air.
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Figure 5.2: A comparison of the average rate of multicast and ARP packets on the network
that we measured traffic on.
5.4 mDNS in a campus wireless network
Fig. 5.2 shows the average multicast and ARP packet rate categorized by protocols. It
shows that the majority of multicast packets in the network are mDNS packets. LLMNR
packets make up a very small portion of multicast packets. The figure also shows that
there are other service discovery protocols (SRVLOC, SSDP and UPnP), but the number of
those service discovery packets is very small. Therefore, we will mainly focus on mDNS. We
also measure the number of ARP packets since ARP packets are one of the most popular
broadcast packets in the network. As we can see, the number of mDNS packets was much
higher than that of ARP packets.
5.4.1 Number of mDNS packets
Fig. 5.3 shows the average mDNS packet rate by service type. We show the five major
applications based on the number of mDNS packets. It shows that the majority of mDNS
packets are generated by the iTunes ( daap. tcp) application. Table 5.1 shows the average
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Figure 5.3: The average mDNS packet rate by service types
number of users seen on the networks during the measurement. As we can see from the
table, the number of iTunes users is the largest. In the service resolution process of iTunes,
iTunes sends SRV and TXT query records to all iTunes users, and responds with SRV and
TXT records. The records are periodically sent with a delay based on an exponential backoff
algorithm mentioned in the mDNS specification [56]. The period starts from one second
and goes up to one hour. When the period reaches one hour, the exponential backoff halts,
and messages are sent every hour after this. This service resolution process generates many
mDNS packets.
In other service types, such as Internet printing protocol, even though the process of
querying and responding for SRV and TXT record processing exists, the number of users is
small and users do not actively use the application.
5.4.2 Channel utilization of mDNS packets on wireless networks
One multicast packet occupies the channel twice. During the uplink transmission of a
mDNS packet to an AP, the transmission to an AP is unicast. However, on the downlink
transmission of mDNS packets from an AP to many multicast users, the transmission is
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Table 5.1: Average number of mDNS users seen in networks during measurement when the
total of 944 users (including other users who do not use mDNS) are seen in the network. It
shows five major service types.
Service type number of users
iTunes music sharing ( daap. tcp) 188
Apple file sharing( afpovertcp. tcp) 83
iChat AV ( presence. tcp) 25
Workgroup manager ( workstation. tcp) 49
Internet printing protocol ( ipp. tcp) 16
multicast. Therefore, all the uplink transmission rates depend on the users’ network inter-
faces. Since most users use laptop computers with IEEE 802.11 g wireless cards, most of
the uplink transmission follows IEEE 802.11 g. However, the downlink transmission rate is
fixed to 11 Mb/s since in Columbia University’s wireless network, an AP has to match the
transmission rate with the lowest maximum transmission rate between IEEE 802.11 g and
b even though most users use a IEEE 802.11 g wireless card. The maximum transmission
rates are 54 Mb/s and 11 Mb/s for IEEE 802.11 g and b, respectively.
We calculate the bandwidth usage of mDNS packets by the channel utilization, ρ. The






where TD and TU are the total downlink and uplink transmission time of mDNS packets
per unit time including all overhead. The receiver can synchronize the incoming signal by
the physical layer convergence protocol (PLCP) preamble before receiving actual data, and
the header provides information of the frame [63]. Therefore, we include the PLCP for
performance measurement. The downlink transmission time, TD, is
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where TDIFS is the time length of DIFS, Td is the transmission time of a mDNS downlink
packet, and Nd is the average number of mDNS downlink packet in unit time. Lm is the
average mDNS packet size including MAC layer header, Rd is the downlink transmission
rate, and TPLCP is the time length of the PLCP preamble and header. Table 5.2 shows the
parameters of IEEE 802.11 b/g.
Table 5.2: Parameters in IEEE 802.11 b/g
Parameters Size (bits) Tx rate (Mb/s) Tx time (µs)
PLCP Preamble 144 1 144
PLCP Header 48 1 48
SIFS - - 10
DIFS - - 50
ACK 112 Rc 112/Rc
The uplink transmission time, TU , is









where TSIFS is the time length of SIFS, Tu is the transmission time of the mDNS uplink
packets, and Nu is the average number of mDNS uplink packet in unit time. Ru is the
uplink transmission rate. TACK is the transmission time of control frames, ACK. Lc is the
length of control frames, ACK. Rc is the transmission rate of ACK. Our measurements show
that the transmission rates of ACK from APs are the same as data transmission rates from
users.
5.4.3 The effect of multiple APs on the same channel
In a large WiFi installation, a station can typically see multiple APs on the same channel,
which are called co-channel APs. However, the station associates with only one of the APs.
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(b) Average rate of mDNS uplink packets associated with co-channel APs
Figure 5.4: Average rate of mDNS packets associated with co-channel APs. They show
maximum, minimum, and mean values of packet rates.
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Each of these APs sends out the same multicast packet to the stations associated with them.
Therefore, even though a station receives packets from an associated AP, packets from all
co-channel APs consume bandwidth at the station. Fig. 5.4(a) and Fig. 5.4(b) shows the
measured maximum and minimum rates as well as the average rate of the captured downlink
and uplink mDNS packets at several APs. As we can see, the same multicast packets from
several APs are captured by a station. When we calculate the utilization, ρ, we should
consider this co-channel effect. Therefore, the average rate of mDNS downlink and uplink
packets is the sum of all downlink and uplink packets from the co-channel APs. The values
of Nd and Nu are 190 packets/sec and 1.4 packets/sec, respectively. The reason for the
difference between the two values is that on the downlinks, the packets come from all users
in the campus wireless network, but on the uplinks, the packets come only from the users in
the small local area. In our measurement, Lm is 578 bytes. Therefore, the utilization, ρ is
0.13. Since other packets cannot be transmitted during the transmission of mDNS packets,
we can say that mDNS traffic consumes 13 percent of the total bandwidth.
If we do not consider the co-channel effect (i.e., consider only the packets associated
with AP #1), the value of Nd and Nu are 70.9 packets/sec and 1.3 packets/sec, respectively.
Therefore, the utilization, ρ is 0.05. Therefore, the effect of mDNS packets for bandwidth
usage varies depending on the number of APs on a channel.
These measurement results are specific to the wireless network in our campus network.
However, we argue that if the measurement is performed at other places and college cam-
puses and if the network size (number of users and number of APs) is similar, the results
will be similar. Furthermore, since three channels (channel 1, 6, and 11) are generally used
in most IEEE 802.11 b/g, there will always be multiple APs on the same channel and inter-
ference will occur between the APs. If the number of users is different, it might be possible
to extrapolate our results by scaling our results according to the number of users.
5.5 Comparison of service discovery models
To see the trade-offs between different service discovery models in terms of packet overhead
and service discovery delay under different network sizes and lifetimes, we define and an-
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(c) Periodic announcements and browsing
Figure 5.5: The service announcements and browsing models (A: service announcements,
B: service browsing, R: responding, P: period)
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alyze three different service discovery models: periodic announcements, periodic browsing,
periodic announcements and browsing. We do not consider co-channel effects since the
number of co-channel APs and the signal strength of the APs could vary in different places.
Therefore, we only consider the traffic that belongs to one AP. We do not consider the
mechanisms used in the mDNS protocol to reduce the number of packets, such as aggrega-
tion of several answers into one packet. Therefore, the models in this analysis are similar
but not exactly the same as multicast DNS service discovery protocol. The objective of
this analysis is to compare different service discovery models under different network sizes
and lifetimes. This analysis provides insights in choosing proper models that make different
trade-offs in different environments.
We assume that users join the network with Poisson distribution with rate λ. The
average lifetime users spend in the network is T . We assume that the service announce,
browse and response packets are transmitted by multicast, and the system is in steady
state. The average number of users in the network is N and the average number of users
associated with each AP is Na. The service announce and browse period is P .
5.5.1 Model A: Periodic announcements
Fig. 5.5(a) shows the periodic announcements model. In this model, users discover services
only by the periodic announcements (A) of other users. Therefore, there are no browse and
response packets. On the uplinks, Na users associated with an AP send announce packets.
Thus, the average uplink rate is Na/P . On the downlinks, the AP transmits announcement
packets from all N users to users associated with that AP. Thus, the average downlink rate
is N/P .
Since the service discovery is accomplished only through announcements, the maximum
service discovery delay is the period, P . When we assume that distribution of the service
announcements follows uniform distribution, the mean service discovery delay to find one
particular service is P/2. The mean service discovery delay to find all services is P −
P/(2(N − 1)). Thus, as N increases, the mean service discovery delay to find all services
goes to the finite period, P .
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5.5.2 Model B: Periodic browsing
Fig. 5.5(b) shows the periodic browsing model. In this model, users discover services by
periodic browsing (B) and the response to the browsing requests of other users. Therefore,
there are no announce packets. On the uplinks, Na users browse a service. Thus, the rate
of uplink browse packets is Na/P . Each user responds to the browse of other users (that
are in the same AP) and other users (that are in the different APs). Thus, the average rate
of uplink response packets is (Na − 1)Na/P + Na(N −Na)/P . On the downlinks, the AP
transmits the service browse packets from all N users. Thus, the rate of downlink browse
packets is N/P . Since users response to the browse packets from all other users, the rate
of downlink response packets is (N − 1)N/P .
The service discovery delay in this model is only one network round trip time because
when a user who has just joined the network browses for a service, others respond immedi-
ately. Therefore, this delay is very small.
5.5.3 Model C: Periodic announcements and browsing
Fig. 5.5(c) shows the periodic announcements and browsing model. In this model, users
discover services both by periodic announcements (A) and periodic browsing (B) of services.
The response packets are transmitted only when a new node joins the network and browses
services. After initially responding to the service browsing of new nodes, users do not send
response packets for service browsing requests until other new nodes join the network. The
number of response packets depends on the arrival rate of new nodes, λ. Therefore, the rate
of announce and browse packets is the sum of model A and model B. On the downlinks,
AP transmits all responses from N − 1 users. Thus, the rate of downlink response packets
is (N − 1)λ. On the uplinks, there are two cases: the newly joined user is associated with
the AP and the newly joined node is associated with one of the other APs. The probability
that a newly joined node is associated with the current AP is Na/N when we assume that
selecting an AP which a new node is associated with follows uniform distribution. Therefore,
the rate of uplink response packets is λ(Na − 1)Na/N + λNa(N −Na)/N .
The service discovery delay in this model is also very small. The reason is the same as
the one for the model B.
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Table 5.3 shows the average rate of service discovery packets with different models by
types of packets.
5.5.4 Comparison of models
From Little’s law, N = λT where T is the average lifetime users spend in the network, we
can calculate the arrival rate, λ, given the average number of users (N) in the network and
their average lifetime (T ) in the network. We vary the lifetime of users from 10 minutes
to 1 hour. We vary the average number of users in the network (N) from 100 to 500. We
assume that the average number of users associated with an AP is 10 (Na = 10). Fig. 5.6
shows the average service discovery packet rate of three different models when the period
(P ) is 30 minutes. As we can see in this figure, model A generates the lowest number
of service discovery packets. In model A, the average rate of service discovery packets
increases slightly as N increases. The service discovery delay of model A is the highest
since the service discovery only depends on the announcements from users. The worst case
of the service delay of model A is P (30 minutes). The mean service discovery delay to find
a particular service is 15 minutes and the mean service discovery delay to find all services
is 29.95 minutes (when N = 300). The delay of the two other models is very small since
existing nodes immediately respond to the service browsing of nodes that have just joined.
The number of service discovery packets in model C depends on the lifetime of users. When
the lifetime is 10 minutes, the number of service discovery packets is the largest. When we
compare model B and model C (which has a lifetime of 30 minutes), the result is almost
the same. In model C, a new node joins the network every 30 minutes, and in model B, the
browsing period is 30 minutes. Therefore, the result is the same.
Choosing the proper model is based on the network environments and characteristics.
In terms of low service discovery delay, models B and C are the best choice. In terms of
low traffic overhead, model A is the best choice. If the average lifetime of nodes is high,
model C gives low traffic overhead and low service discovery delay. If the average lifetime
of nodes is low, model C generates high traffic overhead.
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Model C (lifetime = 10 minutes)
Model C (lifetime = 30 minutes)
Model C (lifetime = 60 minutes)
Figure 5.6: The average service discovery packet rate of model A, B and C when period (P)
is 30 minutes. The average rates are obtained from the Table 5.3.
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5.6 Conclusion
mDNS uses multicast, so it generates significant traffic overhead and consumes network
resources, especially in a campus network. However, there has been no formal measurement
of mDNS in large wireless networks, so we do not really know how much traffic overhead
mDNS generates.
We define and analyze three different service discovery models which correspond most
closely to DNS-SD/mDNS: periodic announcements, periodic browsing, and periodic an-
nouncements and browsing models. The analysis shows the average rate of service discovery
packets of different models under different network sizes and lifetimes. We found that model
A generates lowest traffic overhead. Models B and C have less service discovery delay.
We evaluated the network traffic overhead (bandwidth usage) of mDNS packets by
measurements. Our measurement shows that the current overhead of mDNS packets is not
severe as mDNS traffic consumes 13 percent of the total bandwidth. In congested networks,
however, such as those at IETF meetings or conferences, this overhead can have adverse
effect on the performance of other network services. Furthermore, this consumption of
bandwidth is mostly due to one popular application, iTunes, as about 69 percent of mDNS
packets are iTunes packets. This means that if there are other popular applications which
work in a manner similar to iTunes, or if the number of users using iTunes increases, the
overhead of mDNS traffic will increase even more.
Our measurement and analysis of different service discovery models can provide insights
for making design choice with different trade-offs in terms of traffic overhead and service
discovery delay for different network sizes and lifetimes.
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Chapter 6
Evaluation of control message
overhead of a DHT-based p2p
system
6.1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer (p2p) architectures have received a lot of attention in the networking commu-
nity and there is a trend towards designing p2p services instead of client-server services.
There are many applications of p2p systems, such as p2p Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
and p2p content distribution. P2p SIP enables Voice over IP (VoIP) services without a
central server and p2p content distribution enables content distribution and search without
a central server. Despite this trend to move from traditional client-server to p2p service ar-
chitecture designs, there has been no formal evaluation of the two approaches under various
churn rates and networking sizes.
In this chapter, we provide an analysis and simulation of a well-known DHT-based p2p,
Chord [15], and compare it to client-server service architectures [16]. We show how churn
rate and networking size affects the control message overhead of a DHT-based p2p system
and compare it with that of a client-server service architecture. We introduce the minimum
update period for the stabilization process in the Chord protocol that achieves a targeted
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF CONTROL MESSAGE OVERHEAD OF A
DHT-BASED P2P SYSTEM 110
probability of success for join and routing table fixing operations.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.1.1 presents overview
of DHTs. We describe related work in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, we compute the control
message overhead to maintain a p2p structure. Finally, Section 6.4 compares the bandwidth
usage for name lookup service of p2p to that of a client-server system.












Figure 6.1: Identifier circle in Chord and finger table of node 3. There are three nodes, 0,
1, and 3. There are three keys, 1, 2, and 6. successor(k) is the successor node of key k.
When node 3 finds the successor of identifier 1, it asks node 0 because 1 is in the dotted
interval (the third entry) of the table.
A distributed hash table (DHT) is designed to efficiently manage structured peer-to-
peer systems. DHT provides lookup services using a distributed hash table, mapping keys
to values. There are several DHT protocols, such as Chord [15], CAN [70] and Kadem-
lia [71]. This thesis focuses on Chord to explain how a DHT works. In the Chord protocol
specification [15], there are two identifiers: the node identifier generated by hashing the
node’s IP address and the key identifier generated by hashing an application-specific key.
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In p2p SIP, for example, the key identifier can be generated by hashing the SIP address of
a user. In Chord, the DHT entry for a key is stored in the node whose node identifier is
equal to the key identifier or the node whose identifier is immediately larger than the key
identifier as described in Fig. 6.1. Each node maintains a finger table (i.e., routing table) to
accelerate the lookup. The number of entries of the finger table is O(logN) where N is the
number of nodes. Each ith entry of node X has interval that lies between [X+2i, X+2i+1).
This interval is used to select the closest node in the table to the identifier that we want
to find. Querying the node whose identifier is closest to the key in the finger table enables
the lookup of the key’s successor node. When a new node joins the system (JOIN), it finds
the immediate successor, updates its finger table, and locates the proper position in the
identifier circle. Each node runs a stabilization protocol to guarantee that existing nodes
are reachable. The stabilize() procedure (STABILIZE) periodically verifies the immediate
successor and the fix fingers() procedure (FIXFINGERS) periodically refreshes and updates
finger table entries.
6.2 Related work
S. Jain et al. [72] discuss load balancing in a distributed hash table (DHT)-based system,
but they do not discuss control message overhead and do not consider churn rates. J.
Li [73] evaluate the performance of DHT designs as a function of churn rates, but their
main consideration is how to reduce lookup latency, not the maintenance of the structure.
S. Krishnamurthy et al. [74] theoretically analyze the number of failed lookup and lookup la-
tency of Chord protocol considering churn rate, but they do not discuss the control message
overhead and bandwidth usage.
6.3 Control message overhead to maintain p2p structure
We evaluate the number of control messages needed to maintain the p2p structure through
simulation and analysis. These control messages differentiate the overhead in a p2p system
from a client-server architecture. We use the OMNeT++ simulator [75] and OverSim [76]
for our simulations. We use the Chord protocol [15] for our evaluations since Chord is one
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of the most popular DHT protocols.
In our model, nodes arrive and depart with same Poisson distribution with rate λ. N is
the total number of nodes in the system, T is the update period of the Chord stabilization
mechanism, and H is the average lookup path length of the N -node system.
Fig. 6.2 shows the number of control messages in a Chord-based p2p system. The churn
rate, r, is λ/N . Fig. 6.2(a) shows that the number of control messages is affected mainly by
the update period of the stabilization process. Interestingly, the churn rate does not affect
the number of control messages and a higher churn rate even reduces the number of control
messages slightly. To examine this in more detail, we have analyzed the generated number
of each type of control message. As we can see in Fig. 6.2(b), the control message rate
at different churn rates is mainly determined by the FIXFINGERS (FIXFINGERS CALL
and RESPONSE) and JOIN CALL message rate. Therefore, we carefully examined the
FIXFINGERS and JOIN message rate.
6.3.1 Probability of success for JOIN and FIXFINGERS process
The JOIN and FIXFINGERS process will fail if one of the nodes participating in forwarding
messages as part of the JOIN and FIXFINGERS process becomes unreachable. A newly
joining node will fail to find the immediate successor if one of the nodes that participate in
forwarding messages as part of the JOIN process has left the network. A node will fail to
find the successor node of entries in the finger table if one of the nodes that participates in
forwarding messages as part of the FIXFINGERS process has left.
Psj is the probability of success for a JOIN process and Ndj is the number of nodes
leaving before a new node joins after a previous update period. Pr(Ndj = n,X) is the
probability that n nodes have left and the new node joins after time X. The time, X,
follows the uniform distribution between [0, T ].
Pr(Ndj = n,X) =
∞∫
−∞
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(b) Control message rate of p2p architecture based on control message types when N = 100 and T =
100 seconds
Figure 6.2: The simulation results of the number of control messages in p2p service archi-
tecture. N is the number of nodes in the system and T is the update period of the Chord
stabilization mechanism.
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Nj is the average number of JOIN CALL messages per join sent by a newly joining node
in order to join the p2p system. The average path length for a successful JOIN process is
1/2logN [15]. When a JOIN process fails, the probability that any node along the message
path has left is the same. Therefore, we can say that the average path length for a failed










Psf is the probability of success for the FIXFINGERS operation. Ndf is the number of
nodes leaving during one update period. Pr(Ndf = n, T ) is the probability that n nodes
























Nf is the average number of FIXFINGERS CALL messages per node per update period
which are sent by each node to update its finger table. The average number of table entries
is O(logN) [15].
Fig. 6.3(a) shows the probability of FIXFINGERS process success. As the churn rate
increases, the probability of success for the FIXFINGERS process decreases. The reason is
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that more nodes performing the FIXFINGERS process have departed and the finger tables
are not fixed until the next update period as the churn rate increases. Fig. 6.3(a) also
shows that as the number of nodes increases, the probability of success decreases at the
same churn rate. The reason is that the lookup path length increases as the number of
nodes increases. Therefore, the higher the number of nodes, the higher the probability that
one of the nodes performing the FIXFINGERS CALL process is missing. Fig. 6.3(b) shows
that the probability of JOIN success decreases as the churn rate increases. The reason is
the same as for the FIXFINGER CALL process.
Fig. 6.4(a) and Fig. 6.4(b) plot the FIXFINGERS CALL and JOIN CALL message rate,
respectively. If the FIXFINGERS process fails, the FIXFINGERS CALL messages will not
be forwarded. Therefore, the FIXFINGERS CALL message rate decreases as the churn rate
increases. However, if the JOIN procedure fails, JOIN CALL messages are retransmitted
during the next update period until the JOIN process succeeds. Therefore, the JOIN CALL
message rate increases as the churn rate increases.
6.3.2 The tradeoff between probability of JOIN and FIXFINGERS pro-
cess and control message rate
Fig. 6.5 shows how the update period affects the success probability of the FIXFINGERS
and JOIN process for churn rates. The figure shows that we can control the probability
of success by adjusting the update period, given the average number of nodes and churn
rate. However, if the update period is too high, too many control messages are generated.
Therefore, there is a trade-off between the probability of success and the control message
overhead. Based on this trade-off, we evaluate the bandwidth usage under churn rates and
network sizes in the next section.
6.4 Bandwidth usage for name lookup service
We assume that the p2p system serves as a name lookup mechanism in order to compare
it with the DNS lookup mechanism. Based on an analysis of the FIXFINGERS and JOIN
procedure, we calculate the bandwidth usage in the DHT-based p2p (Chord) system. The
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF CONTROL MESSAGE OVERHEAD OF A
DHT-BASED P2P SYSTEM 116
bandwidth usage, B, is (Nc +NlRq)L, where Nc is the average number of control messages
per second, Nl is the average number of lookup messages per request, Rq is the request rate,
and L is the average message size. We fix the update period of the stabilization process to
ensure that the probability of success for the JOIN and FIXFINGERS process is above a
targeted success rate using the formulas described previously, given network size and churn
rate. The targeted success rate depends on the policy of the service providers. If the JOIN
process fails, the lookup of the keys, which are not located in the joined node, will fail. If
the FIXFINGERS process fails, the lookups will succeed but the lookup speed will slow.
We assume that the targeted probability of success for the JOIN process is 0.98.
The average number of control messages per user, Nc, is the sum of the all control
message rates. Fig. 6.2(b) shows all the control message types. As above, the JOIN CALL
message rate and FIXFINGERS CALL message rate can be calculated by using the for-
mulas in Section 6.3.1. The JOIN RESPONSE and SUCCESSOR HINT message rate is
the same as the node arrival rate, λ. The FIXFINGERS RESPONSE message rate is
(Psf · logN)/T . The STABLIZIZE CALL, STABILIZE RESPONSE, NOTIFY CALL, and
NOTIFY RESPONSE message rates have the same value, 1/T .
The number of average lookup messages per user, Nl, is 1/2 · logN in the p2p system.
We assume that the service request rate per user, Rq, is one per hour and the average
message size, L, is 100 bytes. For the client-server architecture, the DNS lookup messages,
one packet per request, is the only overhead, so the message overhead for client-server
architecture is 0.22 bits per second per user. The network size and churn rate does not
affect the value since the value is per user. Table 6.1 shows the update period (T ) to
maintain the p2p structure and bandwidth usage per user (B) of p2p under various churn
rates (r) and networking sizes (N). As we can see, even in networks that span the Internet
(i.e., where there are a million users) and a high churn rate (i.e., the lifetime of each user
is one hour, so the churn rate is 1/3600), the message overhead for users in a DHT-based
p2p (Chord) system, 12.5 kilobits per second per user (about 4 Gigabytes per month per
user), is a modest amount of traffic. However, this is about 22 % of average AT&T digital
subscriber line (DSL) broadband consumption (about 18 Gigabytes per month per user) in
the United States [17].
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Table 6.1: Update period (T ) and bandwidth usage (B) per user of p2p architecture under
various churn rate (r) and networking size (N).
N r=1/3600 r=1/18000 r=1/36000
1000 T=29 sec, B=1.7 kb/s T=145 sec, B=0.4 kb/s T=290 sec, B=0.2 kb/s
10000 T=20 sec, B=4.1 kb/s T=100 sec, B=0.8 kb/s T=200 sec, B=0.4 kb/s
100000 T=18 sec, B=6.9 kb/s T=90 sec, B=1.4 kb/s T=180 sec, B=0.7 kb/s
1000000 T=14 sec, B=12.5 kb/s T=70 sec, B=2.5 kb/s T=140 sec, B=1.2 kb/s
6.5 Conclusion
We have analyzed the bandwidth usage of a DHT-based p2p (Chord) system stabilizing
under various churn rates and networking sizes. We have shown that stabilizing the DHT-
based p2p (Chord) structure can be performed by adjusting the update period given the
expected churn rate and network size. We have discussed that in high churn rate and
Internet-wide networking, the message overhead for DHT-based p2p (Chord) architectures
is moderate,but still a significant fraction of average DSL consumption.
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Figure 6.3: Probability of success for FIXFINGERS and JOIN process when T = 100. N
is the number of nodes in the system and T is the update period of the Chord stabilization
mechanism.
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of nodes in the system and T is the update period of the Chord stabilization mechanism.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This thesis presents the network system design of robust, ubiquitous, and distributed sys-
tems. It provides a system level solution to prevent denial-of-service attacks, to efficiently
provide Internet access in intermittently connected networks, and to design an efficient
service discovery mechanism and provide a guideline to design distributed p2p systems.
First, this thesis presents a signaling architecture for network traffic authorization called
permission-based sending (PBS). This aims to prevent denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and
any other forms of unauthorized traffic. It describes a PBS NSIS signaling layer protocol
(PBS NSLP) and a system architecture. By using on-path signaling, end hosts set up
permission states along the data path. This explicit signaling mechanism provides easy
installation of permission states on senders, receivers, and intermediary routers. PDA
provides a monitoring mechanism which alleviates the deficiencies of proactive approaches.
We analyze various attack models and show how PBS can be used to counter those attacks.
In particular, our PBS can effectively prevent Byzantine attacks, which have been considered
difficult to counteract. Furthermore, our evaluation shows that the signaling overhead is
small enough to make PBS a practical solution for large scale networks.
Second, this thesis discusses problems that occur in intermittently connected networks
and provides a system level solution. There are two problems at the beginning of a network
connection period when a group of users move together: the resource limitation problem and
the flash crowd problem. We propose Internet Cache on Wheels (ICOW) for public transit
systems where access points are installed at transportation stations to provide Internet
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access. ICOW increases bandwidth availability using a smart cache on public transportation
and alleviates the flash crowd problem. ICOW also increases system efficiency.
Finally, this thesis describes an efficient service discovery mechanism that reduces en-
ergy consumption and service discovery delay in ad-hoc networks. We have designed a
cross-layer architecture that reduces energy consumption using the detection of network
interface changes. This thesis also analyzes the overhead of service discovery mechanisms
in real-world p2p networks. It presents the measurement result of message overhead caused
by DNS-based service discovery (DNS-SD), which works with Multicast DNS (mDNS), in
campus-wide wireless networks. Indeed, these multicast packets are disseminated through-
out a campus to discover services that other peers provide. Hence, they consume bandwidth
and cause a non-trivial impact on wireless networks. Actually, our measurement indicates
that it consumes 13 % of wireless link bandwidth in campus-wide networks. Another anal-
ysis of message overhead from this thesis is the control message overhead of DHT-based
p2p, Chord, in different churn rates and networking sizes. This thesis introduces a system
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